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I. Introduction
Noting the sparse constitutional text articulating foreign affairs control,
2
many scholars believe the Framers preferred a system in which the Legislative
and Executive branches struggle for control of foreign relations.3 Nevertheless,
Supreme Court rulings during the post-Vietnam era have increasingly accepted
the broadening of presidential foreign policy-making power.4 Given this fact, it
2. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 16 (2d ed. 1996)
(discussing the significant lack of constitutional text on foreign relations).
3. See, e.g., id. at 84 ("That the Constitution is especially inarticulate in allocating
foreign affairs powers... serve[s] and nurture[s] political forces inviting struggle."); MARK
TUSHNET, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE LAW 32 (1988) (arguing that the Framers "established a
political system in which the President and Congress would fight each other for [foreign affairs]
power"). But see Dick Cheney, Congressional Overreaching in Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE CONSTrrrunoN 102 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A. Licht eds., 1990) (citing
disapprovingly EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 171 (4th rev. ed.
1957)) ("The Constitution does not really distribute powers at random; it is not simply an
'invitation to struggle."').
4. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY CONsTrruTioN 134 (1990) (discussing
the recent judicial trend toward favoring executive control of foreign affairs). Dean of Yale Law
School, Harold Hongju Koh, notes: "Whether on the merits or on justiciability grounds, the
courts have ruled for the president in these cases with astonishing regularity." Id. Reacting to
this trend, Congress has confronted and challenged the President through legislation that
achieves mixed results. See HENiN, supra note 2, at 85 (commenting on the War Powers
Resolution and presidents who "have challenged its constitutionality and have sometimes
1220
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is not surprising that Presidents steadily attempt to amass foreign policy-making
power through unilateral executive action.5 In the wake of the International
Court of Justice's (ICJ) final judgment in Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Avena),6  President George W. Bush asserted
unprecedented control over foreign affairs through dual unilateral executive
actions.7
In Avena, the ICJ held that the United States must afford fifty-one
convicted Mexican nationals "review and reconsideration" because of Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)8 violations. 9 The Supreme Court
intended to review the ICJ's finding in Medellin v. Dretke;10 however, before
the Court could rule, President Bush took dual unilateral actions that caused a
divided Court to dismiss the case." First, President Bush issued a
Memorandum to Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez announcing that the states
should comply with the ICJ's ruling in only those cases implicated in Avena.12
Second, Bush directed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to send a letter to
the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan stating that the United States
withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR.13 By taking these unilateral
steps, the Executive Branch created a number of separation of powers conflicts.
Specifically, the Memorandum violates principles of federalism and creates
conflict between the Executive Branch and the states.14 The Memorandum also
flouted its restrictions").
5. See CHARLES L. LOFGREN, GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE 38 (1986)
(discussing the history of unilateral executive action in foreign policy).
6. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imusimus
judgment_2004033 l.pdf; see infra Part II.A (discussing Avena).
7. See infra Part II.B-C (explaining the dual unilateral executive actions); Part IV.A
(discussing the strategy behind the unilateral actions).
8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963,21 U.S.T. 77,596 U.N.T.S.
261, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ile/texts/instrunents/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf#
search=vienna%convention%20on%consular/o20relations.
9. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128 153(8).
10. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005); see infra Part II.D (explaining Medellin).
11. See Medellin, 544 U.S. at 666-67 (dismissing the case).
12. See Memorandum from the President of the United States (Feb. 28,2005), available
at http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1109791080.shtml (determining that the state courts will
comply with Avena); see also infra Part II.B (explaining the Presidential Memorandum); Part
IV.A. I (analyzing the potential effect of the Memorandum).
13. See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec'y of State, to Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Sec'y-
Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005) (notifying the United Nations of withdrawal) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also infra Part II.C (explaining withdrawal); Part IV.A.2 (analyzing
the potential effect of withdrawal).
14. See Nicole L. Aeschleman, Comment, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations:
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engenders conflict between the Executive and Judicial Branches because it
purports to mandate judicial compliance with the Avena judgment. 15 In
addition, the Memorandum creates conflict between the Executive and
Legislative Branches because it acts contrary to the will of Congress. 16 Finally,
both unilateral actions create conflict between the Executive and Legislative
Branches, because they "dramatically alter the course of U.S. foreign policy'
' 7
without congressional involvement.'8 Although many academic publications
have commented on issues implicated in Avena and Medellin,'9 this Note
remains distinct because it proposes cooperation between the branches instead
of executive ambitions favoring broader presidential foreign affairs power.
This Note argues that United States foreign policy throughout history
supports the Administration's stance in the Presidential Memorandum.2°
Quo Vadas, America?, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 937, 964 (2005) ("[B]ecause the order
originates in the federal government and imposes requirements on the state courts, it infringes
upon state sovereignty.").
15. See id. ("The conflict between the executive branch and the judicial branch exists
because the Presidential Order requires the judiciary to review and reconsider the Mexican
foreign nationals' claims, a decision typically within the realm of the courts.").
16. See Brief for the States of Alabama, et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
3, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005)
(citing Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 353
U.S. 579, 648 (1952)). These states argued that:
[S]ince Youngstown the Supreme Court has recognized that the President's power
is 'at its lowest ebb' when he acts contrary to the will of Congress .... Here, the
federal habeas corpus statute has carefully limited the situations under which
federal authority will reopen state criminal convictions, and that statute plainly bars
relief here.
Id.
17. VICTORIA MARIE KRAFT, THE U.S. CoNsrrruTIoN AND FOREIGN POLICY: TERMINATING
THE TAIWAN TREATY 166 (1991).
18. See id. ("In this situation, even assuming that the president has the support of
Congress, he would be wise to obtain an affirmative endorsement of that policy from Congress
in the form of a 'Consent-of-the-Congress' resolution, a joint resolution of Congress, or
otherwise."); see also HENKIN, supra note 2, at 85 (discussing the need for cooperation between
the political branches on foreign affairs).
19. See, e.g., Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 939 (2005) (proposing ways to eliminate
future ICJ inquiries into United States VCCR violations); Sandra J. Weiland, Note, The Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations: Persuasive Force or Binding Law?, 33 DENy. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 675, 676 (2005) (arguing that "the United States should synthesize the Vienna
Convention into its domestic law"); Laura A. Young, Note, Setting Sail with The Charming
Betsy: Enforcing the International Court of Justice's Avena Judgment in Federal Habeas
Corpus Proceedings, 89 MINN. L. REV. 890, 891 (2005) (arguing for the use of The Charming
Betsy canon to avert potential collisions between the ICJ and domestic courts).
20. This Note does not take a stand on whether the President possesses the extralegal
authority to mandate compliance with the Avena judgment. Rather, it points out the strong
possibility that judicial hesitancy surrounding foreign affairs may leave the legality of the
1222
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Nevertheless, unilateral executive withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
significantly harms the foreign policy interests of the United States. The policy
reasons cited as the basis for the Presidential Memorandum do not support
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. Moreover, this Note argues that the
Executive Branch's unilateral actions illustrate a situation that some scholars
have termed legal, but nonetheless unconstitutional. 2' Specifically, the
President's actions may be technically legal; they are not, however, in the spirit
of the shared foreign policy-making tradition enshrined in the American form
of government. Finally, this Note proposes congressional involvement and
judicial review as the most effective means to accomplish the United States'
ultimate goal of a singular, cohesive foreign policy.
22
To accomplish the preceding goals, Part H provides necessary background
on the Avena decision, both unilateral executive responses, and Medellin. Part
III lays out the incongruence between the purpose of the Presidential
Memorandum and the effects of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. It
details the issues involved and weighs the responsibilities of the President in
light of the federalism concerns of the various states. 23 In contrast, Part IV
surveys the forces contributing to the adoption of an incongruent and
potentially detrimental foreign policy. It analyzes the ongoing battle between
government branches concerning foreign policy control, notes the lack of
congressional response, and comments on the reluctance of the Judicial Branch
Presidential Memorandum ambiguous. Further, this Note does not argue that the United States
acknowledgment of and adherence to international law necessarily bolsters United States
interests. Rather, this Note asserts that the United States should never demand treatment from
foreign nations it is unwilling to accord itself.
21. KRAFt, supra note 17, at 162 (arguing that unilateral presidential exercise of foreign
affairs power may reside "within the black letter of the law, but nonetheless is
'unconstitutional[]' in the sense that his action is wholly destructive of the norms of our
constitutional scheme"). Kraft notes: "When that collective [foreign policy] decision making
process is ignored by the president.., then the consequent action is unconstitutional, even
though it may not be technically illegal and even though ... a legal remedy may not be available
to redress the underlying wrong." Id.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936)
(noting that "[e]ven before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting
through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from the
thirteen colonies"); THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations.").
23. See Brief for Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 13, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22,2005)
(No. WR-50,191-02) (stating that "the President has made a complex and delicate calculation
taking into account the need of the United States to comply with its international obligations, to
pursue its foreign policy interests, to enforce its laws effectively against foreign nationals in the
United States, and to protect Americans abroad").
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to resolve specific conflicts. Part V argues that the Bush administration's
actions may be legal in a technical sense, but they remain ultimately
unconstitutional. It explores the relationship between legality and
constitutionality, shows that the Executive Branch tends to think of foreign
policy decisions in strictly legal rather then constitutional terms, and discusses
the negative effects of the unilateral executive responses to Avena.
II. The Avena Decision and the Unilateral Executive Responses
A. Avena
Three cases alleging that the United States violated VCCR consular
notification requirements have reached the ICJ. 24 This consular notification
requirement seeks to ensure that non-citizen defendants can alert their home
country of pending criminal proceedings. 25 Signed by 166 countries, the
VCCR obligates a country pursuing criminal charges against a foreign national
to inform the detainee without delay of their right to notify the consulate of
their home country.26  If the detainee requests consular notification, the
detaining authorities must inform the consulate and forward any
communication the detained individual desires sent to the consulate.
2 7
Moreover, the VCCR grants the consular authorities the right to visit the
detained individual, to continue correspondence with him or her, and to arrange
legal representation for the person concerned.28
In 1998, the Republic of Paraguay brought a claim to the ICJ alleging that
the United States failed to notify Angel Francisco Breard of his VCCR rights
24. Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of Mexico, (Mex.
v. U.S.), (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imus
order/imus-iapplication_20030109. PDF; Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the
Government of Paraguay (Para. v. U.S.) (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Paraguay Application],
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm; Application
Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
(F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Mar. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Germany Application], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican National
and Consular Convention Rights, The American Society of International Law, Mar. 2005,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insights050309.html (discussing the purpose of the
VCCR) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See id. (explaining the requirements of the VCCR). VCCR requirements apply when
the country detaining a foreign national and the detainee's home country are parties to the
VCCR. Id.
27. See id. (explaining the requirements of the VCCR).
28. See id. (explaining the requirements of the VCCR).
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after his arrest.2 9 Six days after Paraguay initiated proceedings, the ICJ issued a
provisional order asserting that the United States "should take all measures at
its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings.03 Despite this order, the United States
Supreme Court denied Breard's application for a writ in Breard v. Greene.3'
On April 14, 1998, before the ICJ produced a final judgment, the
Commonwealth of Virginia executed Breard.32 On March 2, 1999, the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) brought a claim to the ICJ alleging the United
29. See Paraguay Application, supra note 24 (reporting Paraguay's claim).
30. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 246, 258 (Provisional
Order of Apr. 9) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm
(ordering the United States to stay the execution pending the final judgment).
31. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,378 (1998) (denying petition for habeas corpus,
certiorari, and leave to file a bill of complaint on the petition alleging prejudice based on a
failure to raise in state court the violation of rights under an international treaty). In Breard, the
Supreme Court considered whether Breards' VCCR claim should get review in federal court
because the treaty acts as the "'supreme law of the land' and thus trumps the procedural default
doctrine." Id. at 375. At the time Breardwas considered by the Court, Angel Francisco Breard
was scheduled to be executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Id. at 372. Breard, 20 years
old and a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of attempted rape and murder in 1993. Id. On
appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Breard's convictions and sentence, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari; state collateral relief was subsequently denied as well. Id. In
August of 1996, Breard filed a motion for habeas relief in Federal District Court alleging a
VCCR violation. Id. The District Court held that this claim had no merit because of procedural
default rules. Id. On April 3, 1998, Paraguay initiated proceedings against the United States at
the ICJ, alleging that the United States violated the VCCR in respect to Breard. Id. at 374. On
April 9, 1998, the ICJ released a provisional order requesting that the United States stay the
execution. Id. Following this development, Breard filed a petition for an original writ of habeas
corpus and a stay application with the Supreme Court in order to "enforce" the ICJ's provisional
order. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned that Breard's claims do not trump the procedural
default doctrine. Id. at 375. Although the VCCR has been in continuous effect since 1969, the
Court pointed out that Congress had enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) in 1996; it provides that a habeas petitioner alleging that detention occurred in
violation of"treaties of the United States" will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary
hearing if he "has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings."
Id. at 376 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), (e)(2) (Supp. IV 1994)). The Court found that this rule
denied Breard the right to assert his claim that denial of his VCCR rights prejudiced him. Id. at
376. Finally, the Court articulated a level of dismay that the issue had to be heard when the ICJ
was still considering a final holding; however, the Court found nothing in the existing case law
that would allow it to require a stay of execution. Id. at 378. Justices Stevens, Breyer and
Ginsburg all dissented, arguing that the court should grant the stay. Id. at 379-81.
Consequently, the petition for an original writ of habeas corpus, the motion for leave to file a
bill of complaint, and the petitions for certiorari were denied. Id. at 378.
32. See Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies are Not
Enough, May 1, 1990, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510271998 (last visited
May 31, 2006) (commenting on the execution of Breard) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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States violated the VCCR rights of Walter LaGrand.33 The ICJ issued a
provisional order asserting that the United States "should" stay LaGrand's
execution pending a final judgment by the ICJ. 34 Despite this order, the
Supreme Court denied the FRG and LaGrand's dual applications for a stay of
execution and a writ.35 On March 3, 1999, the state of Arizona executed
LaGrand.36
In Avena, Mexico alleged that the United States violated the VCCR with
respect to fifty-one Mexican nationals facing the death penalty in various
states.3' The ICJ held that the United States had violated the VCCR by failing
to inform Medellin and the other fifty Mexican nationals of their right to notify
Mexican consular officials of their detention.38 The ICJ found that the United
States must "provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration
of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals" to assess
whether the violations "caused actual prejudice," without procedural default
rules precluding such review.39 Significantly, the ICJ dropped the passive
wording of the provisional orders regarding Breard and LaGrand, 40 producing
much more forceful language in Avena.
4
1
The March 2004 Avena decision marked the second time the ICJ ruled
against the United States in finding it violated VCCR obligations.42 The ICJ
33. See Germany Application, supra note 24 (detailing the claim filed by the FRG).
34. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (June 27).
35. See F.R.G. v. U.S., 526 U.S. 111, 111 (1999) (denying motion ofthe FRG for leave to
file a bill of complaint and motion for preliminary injunction against the United States and
Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull); LaGrand v. Ariz., 526 U.S. 1001, 1001 (denying the
application for stay of execution and the petition for a writ of certiorari). In both cases, Justices
Breyer and Stevens dissented, arguing that the Court should grant a stay of execution. F.R.G.,
526 U.S. at 112-14; LaGrand, 526 U.S. at 1001.
36. See Wikipedia, LaGrand case, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaGrand_case (last visited
May 31, 2006) (discussing the LaGrand case) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
37. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 663 (2005) (detailing the allegations).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 128, M 121-23, 153(8) (Mar. 31)).
40. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 246, 41(I) (Provisional
Order of Apr. 9) (stating that the United States "should take all measures at its disposal" to
prevent the executions pending the final ICJjudgment); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9,
29(I)(a) (Provisional Order of Mar. 3) (same).
41. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
128, 153(9) (Mar. 31) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgnentl
imus imusjudgment_2004033 l.pdf (stating that the United States "shall take all measures
necessary" to prevent the executions of the fifty-one Mexican nationals).
42. Id. 153(4); see also LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514-16 (June 21)
1226
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determined that the United States must provide "review and reconsideration" of
the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals to determine whether
they experienced prejudice because of the VCCR violations.43 The ICJ holding
in Avena elaborated that the remedy for the violations should come from greater
judicial proceedings and not at a final clemency stage.44 In many ways the
Avena ruling demonstrates the ICJ's "attempt to find middle ground on this
divisive issue., 45 Specifically, many academic publications have discussed the
manner in which the Avena judgment allows domestic control over potential
enforcement of ICJ holdings within the United States.46
In order to comment on the executive responses, one must first understand
the differing state responses to Avena. A spokesman for Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott concisely articulated the state's position concerning the
Avena decision and the Presidential Memorandum: "The State of Texas
believes no international court supersedes the laws of Texas or the laws of the
United States. We respectfully believe the executive determination
(Presidential Memorandum) exceeds the constitutional bounds of federal
authority. '47 Despite the potent legal opposition Texas faced in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, the Attorney General decided to continue the legal
battle.48 In contrast, the state of Oklahoma approached the issue much
(holding that the United States breached LaGrand's Vienna Convention rights concerning
consular notification). Notably, the ICJ's LaGrand ruling came after LaGrand had been
executed by the state of Arizona.
43. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, 1 138-39, 153(11) (holding that proper review and
reconsideration processes must mandate examination of the initial violation and resulting
prejudice). Avena also held that "full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in
the Vienna Convention" regardless of the "actual outcome of such review and reconsideration."
Id.
44. Id. 141-43. In the ICJ's eyes, the clemency process failed in Breard's and
LaGrand's cases.
45. See Young, supra note 19, at 896 (discussing Avena).
46. See, e.g., Hadar Harris, "We Are the World"-Or Are We? The United States'
Conflicting Views on the Use of International Law and Foreign Legal Decisions, 12 HuM. RTs.
BRIEF 5 (2005) (analyzing the domestic effects ofAvena); Aeschleman, supra note 14 (same);
Weiland, supra note 19 (same); Young, supra note 19 (same).
47. Adam Liptak, US. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2005, at A16; see also Weiland, supra note 19, at 685 (commenting on the state
responses to Avena). Weiland argues: "This result indicates that federalism tensions arise when
balancing the United States' compliance and commitment to international law with the
autonomy of the state's separate criminal justice systems. Texas Governor Rick Perry stated
that the International Court of Justice 'does not have jurisdiction in Texas."' Id.
48. See Julian Ku, Texas' Last Stand on Medellin, Opinio Juris, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://lawoftiations.blogspot.com/2005_03_06lawofnations archive.html (last visited June 2,
2006) (discussing the legal team gathered to argue on Medellin's behalf) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Ku noted:
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differently after Avena and Torres v. Mullin.49 The Oklahoma Pardon and
Parole Board's decision to order an indefinite stay of Torres's execution was in
response to their concern about a possible "miscarriage of justice," and the
subsequent grant of clemency from the Governor displays a level of uneasiness
with VCCR violations. The Oklahoma governor's decision reflected a concern
for human rights and reciprocity for American citizens abroad rather than
deference to the ICJ. Nevertheless, the drastic differences in the responses
from Oklahoma and Texas illustrate the lack of a consistent understanding of
how states should interpret ICJ rulings pertaining to VCCR violations. 50
I am a bit surprised that Texas is going to continue to fight this because now it will
not only have to fight Medellin's attorneys, Mexico's attorneys, but now also the
attorneys for the U.S. government. This may not quite be a legal version of the
Alamo, but it's getting close.
Id.
49. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 951-54, 955-56 (discussing the Oklahoma
reaction to the ICJ holding concerning Osvaldo Torres); Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035
(2003) (denying application for writ of certiorari). In Torres, the Supreme Court considered
Osvaldo Torres's petition for a writ of certiorari to review his case in light of the conflict
between the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Breard and the ICJ's ruling in LaGrand.
Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 95 1. Torres, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in Oklahoma. Id. After exhausting his post-conviction remedies, Torres
petitioned the federal court for habeas corpus relief. Id. Because Torres did not raise his VCCR
claim in state court, the Federal District Court held that application of the procedural default
doctrine denied Torres's writ for a certificate of appealability. Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Id Tores then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id. The Supreme
Court now had the chance to reconcile the conflict between the ruling in Breard and previous
ICJ findings concerning VCCR violations within the United States. Id. Before the Supreme
Court denied Torres's writ, Mexico filed the Avena case, which included Tores, with the ICJ.
Id at 952. Mexico then submitted a request to the U.S. Supreme Court requesting that the
Court wait to rule on Torres's writ until after the ICJ ruled in Avena. Id. The Supreme Court
denied Torres's writ. Id. Notably, Justice Breyer strongly dissented to the denial. Id. Breyer
argued that the Court should wait until after the ICJ had ruled and that the Court needed further
briefing on the precise international legal issues of the case. Id. The ICJ then granted a
provisional measure to stay the execution of three Mexican nationals, including Torres, who
faced execution in the imminent future. Id. at 952-53. "Oklahoma agreed to a temporary stay
of execution for the protected foreign national on its death row, Torres." Id. at 953. On May
13, 2004, days before his scheduled execution, Oklahoma Governor Brad Henry then granted
clemency for Torres. Death Penalty Information Center, Oklahoma Governor Grants Clemency
to Mexican Foreign National, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did--996&scid=64
(last visited June 2, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For Tores, the
state of Oklahoma's reconsideration in light of the ICJ judgment saved his life, despite the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.
50. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 971 ("[L]ower courts are still left without guidance
on how to address future cases. If the situation remains the same, it is likely that courts will
continue to be divided on whether to apply the procedural default doctrine to these cases.").
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B. The Presidential Memorandum
On February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush signed a novel
Memorandum,5' declaring:
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (the "Convention") and the Convention's Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol),
which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide
disputes concerning the "interpretation and application" of the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by
the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, that the United
States will discharge its inter-national obligations under the decision of the
International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States ofAmerica) (Avena), 2004 ICJ
128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comit in cases filed by the 51
Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
Thereafter, the Attorney General sent letters to the various state attorneys
general, informing them of the President's determination and its implications
3
As Governor of Texas, President Bush received numerous notices from
the State Department stressing the extreme importance of reciprocal
enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights.54  However,
President Bush's Memorandum stands in stark contrast with the previous
51. See Ku, supra note 48 (discussing the unprecedented nature of the memorandum).
52. Memorandum from the President of the United States (Feb. 28, 2005).
53. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzalez, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Honorable Greg Abbott,
Tex. Attorney Gen. (Apr. 5, 2005) (explaining the position of the Executive Branch in relation
to Avena, the presidential determination, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, and the
responsibilities of state courts affected by these events).
54. See Sandra Babcock, The Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty
Cases, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 367,376 (2002) (quoting Secretary Albright's Nov. 27, 1998 letter
to Governor Bush). Secretary Albright wrote:
As Secretary of State, ensuring the protection-of American citizens abroad-
including over 300 imprisoned Texans last year-is one of my most important
responsibilities. Our ability to provide such assistance is heavily dependent,
however, on the extent to which foreign governments honor their consular
notification obligations to us. At the same time, we must be prepared to accord
other countries the same scrupulous observance of consular notification
requirements that we expect them to accord the United States and its citizens
abroad.
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Administration's position on similar ICJ provisional measures." In its amicus
curiae brief in Breard, the United States stated that: "The 'measures at [the
United States'] disposal' under our Constitution may in some cases include
only persuasion-such as the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of
Virginia to stay Breard's execution-and not legal compulsion through the
judicial system. That is the situation here.
56
Unlike the Bush administration, the Clinton administration did not have to
consider a final ICJ ruling demanding "review and reconsideration.
57
Following Breard's execution, the United States government found itself in the
embarrassing position of having to apologize to Paraguay for the VCCR
violation. 8 The Clinton administration's predicament and the Supreme Court's
ruling in Breard exemplify the difficulties facing the federal government with
repeated state violations of the VCCR.
C. Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
The United States ratified the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention
in 1963.59 Because the United States wanted to produce a body responsible for
hearing alleged consular notification violations, "[b]oth the [Vienna]
Convention [on Consular Relations] and the Optional Protocol... are
substantially the product of U.S. leadership., 60 In fact, the United States
actually voted "against a motion by the Yugoslav delegation that would have
weakened the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ."61 The Protocol provides that
55. See Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 8 (discussing the Clinton administration's
approach to a similar ICJ provisional measure).
56. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371
(1998) (Nos. 97-1390 and 97-8214), quoted in Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 8.
57. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 246, 258 (Provisional
Order of Apr. 9) (ordering the United States to "not execute pending the final decision").
58. U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesman, Text of Statement Released in
Asuncion, Para., (Nov. 4, 1998); see William J. Aceves, Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States), 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 924, 927 (1999) (commenting on the United States' response to the execution of
Breard).
59. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 21, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 325.
60. See Brief for American Citizens Abroad (ACA) as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June
22, 2005) (discussing the diplomatic process that led to the Optional Protocol).
61. See id. at 11 (detailing the persistence of the United States diplomats in relation to the
formation of the Optional Protocol). The Yugoslav delegation wished to add a section to the
United States proposal stating that:
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"[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice., 62 A party to the Optional Protocol can bring a dispute with another
party to the Optional Protocol, 63 but the U.N. Security Council provides the
only means for enforcing an ICJ judgment.64 Because the United States sits as
a permanent member on the Council with veto power, the United States can
block any Security Council action aimed at mandating United States
65compliance.
In the past, the United States has depended on the ICJ as a forum for
redress of international grievances.66 Following the 1979 takeover of the
United States embassy in Tehran, the United States initiated the first claim ever
to utilize the ICJ's compulsoryjurisdiction under the Optional Protocol.67 That
case led to the United States obtaining a favorable judgment ordering Iran to
comply with the Vienna Convention.68 After Iran's failure to comply with the
ICJ ruling, the United States condemned Iran's position.69 In response to Iran's
refusal to abide with the ICJ's order to release the hostages, President Carter
asserted that Iran was showing "contempt, not only for international law, but for
Any contracting party may, at the time of signing or ratifying this Convention or of
acceding thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1, of
this article [the United States proposal]. The other contracting parties shall not be
bound by the said paragraph with respect to any contracting party which has
formulated such a reservation.
See Report of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, Vienna,
Austria, Mar. 4 to Apr. 22, 1963, reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., May 8,
1969, at 72-73 (discussing the United States delegations' experiences at the United Nations
Conference on Consular Relations).
62. Optional Protocol, supra note 59, at art. I.
63. Id.
64. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 975 (discussing ICJ judgment enforcement).
65. Id.; see Dr. Danesh D. Sarooshi, Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, http://
www.globalpolicy.org/security/gensc.htm (last visited June 2, 2006) (discussing the Security
Council veto option) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Brief for Foreign Sovereigns as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, Ex Parte
Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22,2005) (noting cases the
United States has commenced before the ICJ); International Court of Justice: List of Cases
Brought Before the Court Since 1946, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited
June 4, 2006) (recording the cases heard by the ICJ since 1946) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
67. Brief for Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 66, at 6.
68. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,
95, Judgment, (May 24).
69. See Brief for Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 66, at 6 (noting the United States
assertion that Iran must comply with an ICJ judgment) (citing Muskie Issues a Plea on
Hostages, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1980, at A3).
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the entire international structure for securing the peaceful resolution of
differences among nations. 70  United States diplomats have often called upon
Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and China to comply with VCCR standards when
detention of American citizens occurs in those countries.7' Moreover, the
United States has been a party to more ICJ cases than any other nation, and has
initiated ICJ proceedings more often than any other country.72
On March 7, 2005, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
notified the United Nations Secretary-General of the United States' withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol: 73 "This letter constitutes notification by the United
States of America that it hereby withdraws from the aforesaid Protocol. As a
consequence of this withdrawal, the United States will no longer recognize the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in that Protocol.
74
This letter effectively ended the potential for further ICJ rulings against the
United States concerning VCCR violations because the Optional Protocol
established the ICJ's jurisdiction to hear such cases.75 It also effectively ended
the United States' ability to initiate ICJ proceedings on behalf of American
citizens detained abroad.
70. Philippe Sands, An Execution Heard Around the World, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16,1998, at
B9 (quoting President Carter's statement concerning the Iran hostage crisis).
71. See Transcript of State Dep "t Regular Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., July 15, 1999
(commenting on the detention of a United States citizen, James Rubin, State Department
Spokesman, stated: "We remind the government of North Korea of its obligation under the
Interim Consular Agreement of 1994 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to
permit consular access to detained U.S. Citizens"); Transcript of State Dep 't Regular Briefing,
FED. NEWS SERV., Aug. 19, 1999 (commenting on a request for access and immediate grant of
access to U.S. citizen detained in China); Iraqis Refuse Access to Americans for Second Day,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 19, 1995 (quoting State Department spokesman: "Obviously, we are
extremely disappointed that the Iraqi government has reneged on its promise to allow these
weekly visits. We're disappointed because that is their legal obligation under the Vienna
Convention"); S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the
Right of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 729 (1995) (documenting American
agitation with notification delay).
72. See Brief of ACA at 11, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex.
Crim. App. June 22, 2005) (noting that the United States utilizes the ICJ more than any other
nation).
73. See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, supra note 13 (informing of withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol).
74. Id.
75. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting cases brought to the ICJ since 1998
pertaining to the United States' VCCR violations).
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D. Medellin v. Dretke
Medellin, a Mexican national, confessed to partial involvement in the
1993 gang rape and murder of two girls in Texas.7 6 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence of death on direct
appeal.77 Medellin filed a state habeas corpus action, alleging for the first time
that Texas had not notified him of his required VCCR rights. 78 Both the state
trial court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarily affirmed.79 In
response, Medellin filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the VCCR
claim.80 While Medellin's application to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit was pending, the ICJ issued its decision in Avena.8 1 Based on
Medellin's procedural default and previous holdings that the VCCR does not
create individually enforceable rights, the Court of Appeals denied Medellin's
application for a certificate of appealability.82 The Court of Appeals gave no
dispositive effect to the ICJ'sAvena judgment.83 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held
that previous Supreme Court precedent controlled despite the existence of an
ICJ judgment that procedural default does not preclude raising the VCCR claim
on appeal.84
During the course of Supreme Court litigation, President Bush issued
the Presidential Memorandum. 85 In response, Medellin filed a successive
state application for a writ of habeas corpus based on the President's





81. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31); see infra Part IL.A (examining the ICJ ruling in Avena).
82. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 663 (2005).
83. Id.
84. See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that Supreme
Court precedent controlled despite ICJ rulings in conflict). The Fifth Circuit stated: "Though
Avena and LaGrand were decided after Breard, and contradict Breard, we may not disregard
the Supreme Court's clear holding that ordinary procedural default rules can bar Vienna
Convention claims .... [O]nly the Supreme Court may overrule a Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court has not overruled Breard." Id.; see also Christopher J. Le Mon, Post-
Avena Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by United States Courts, 18
LEIDEN J. OF INT'L L. 215, 230 n.89 (2005) (noting that the inclusion of this portion of the Fifth
Circuit's opinion amounts to an invitation for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari).
85. See Memorandum, supra note 12; see supra Part II.B (examining the presidential
memorandum).
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memorandum and the Avena judgment. 86  In Medellin v. Dretke, the
Supreme Court considered two questions:
[F]irst, whether a federal court is bound by the International Court of
Justice's (ICJ) ruling that United States courts must reconsider
petitioner Jose Medellin's claims for relief under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations ... without regard to procedural
default doctrines; and second, whether a federal court should give
effect, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation,
to the ICJ's judgment. s7
The Supreme Court noted that the "state proceeding may provide Medellin
with the very reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that the ICJ
required, and that Medellin now seeks in this proceeding. 8 8 Because of
the pending successive state habeas corpus proceedings, and because of
threshold procedural barriers that could foreclose the availability of federal
habeas corpus relief, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.89
111. Incongruent Foreign Policy
Part III of this Note asserts that the Bush administration's dual
unilateral responses to the Avena decision form an incongruent foreign
policy. It details the historic foreign policy objectives offered by the
administration in support of the Presidential Memorandum. Then, it
examines the unconvincing foreign policy objectives offered by the
Administration in support of the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.
Finally, it demonstrates that withdrawal works against the objectives
offered in support of the Presidential Memorandum.
86. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 663-64 (2005); see also Subsequent Application
for Post-Conviction Writ of Habeas Corpus in Ex Parte Medellin, Trial Cause Nos. 67,5429 and
67,5430 (Tex. Crim App.), at 13 (filed Mar. 24, 2005) ("President Bush's determination and the
Avena Judgment constitute two separate sources of binding federal law.").
87. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 661-62.
88. Id. at 662.
89. See id. at 666-67 (dismissing the writ as improvidently granted); see also Ex Parte
Jose Ernesto Medellin, No. AP-75,207, 2006 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2236, at *31, 45, 74
(2006) (holding that "Avena is not binding federal law," that the President's "unprecedented"
memorandum exceeds "his constitutional authority by intruding into the independent powers of
the judiciary" and "cannot be sustained under the power of the Executive to ensure that the laws
are faithfully executed.") (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006)).
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A. The Presidential Memorandum: Policy Considerations
In the area of foreign affairs, the Department of Justice provides a
significant portion of the legal analysis and representation of the Executive
Branch.90 Authoring an amicus curiae brief in the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Texas, the Department of Justice argued that the issues raised in Medellin
deal with critical foreign policy objectives. 91  Along those lines, the brief
asserted three important purposes served by the Presidential Memorandum.
92
First, the President wants to "protect the interest of United States
citizens abroad. 9 3 Second, he wants to promote "the effective conduct of foreign
relations. 94 Third, compliance "underscores the United States' commitment in
the international community to the rule of law."95
1. United States Citizens Abroad
United States citizens traveling or living overseas can benefit from the
assistance the United States government will provide them if they find themselves
facing a foreign criminal justice system.9 6 American Citizens Abroad,97 a nonprofit,
90. See H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive
Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 538 (1999) (noting that the Department of Justice
shares jurisdiction over legal issues involving foreign affairs with other legal analysts working for the
Executive Branch).
91. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Ex Parte Medellin, No. AP-75,207,
2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005) (articulating the administration's position).
92. See id. at 13 (discussing the reasons the President decided to attempt to mandate judicial




96. See Brief for American Citizens Abroad, supra note 60, at 2 (discussing United States citizens
facing criminal prosecution in other countries). The State Department reports that over 2,500 United
States citizens are arrested abroad each year. OFFICE OF OVERSEAS CrnzENs SERv., U.S. DEP'TOF STATE,
PUBL'N No. 10252, OVERSEAS CmzENs SERvicEs (2004), available at
www.intemationalbenefits.com/travel-tips/overseas-ciizens-services.htm (last visited June 6,2006). The
total that the State Department calculated does not include the United States citizens detained outside the
official criminal justice process; the final calculation reveals that about 6,000 Americans are arrested or
detained abroad every year. Kevin Herbert, Threat to Citizens Overseas, in The Terrorist Threat to
American PresenceAbroad: A Report ofa Consultation ofthe Critical ncidentAnalysis Group and The
Institute for Global Policy Research (Univ. of Virginia) Apr. 12-13, 1999 at Part 11.2.
97. See American Citizens Abroad, http://www.aca.ch/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2006) (defining the
mission of American Citizens Abroad as providing assistance to the United States Government in
"developing cohesive national policies dealing with Americans abroad") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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nonpartisan association dedicated to serving and defending the interests of individual
United States citizens worldwide, explained the needs of United States citizens:
Every year, a significant number of United States citizens traveling or living
overseas find themselves ensnared in the criminal justice system of a foreign
government. Consular assistance provides a vital service to these Americans,
maintaining a desperately needed link to the outside world, and helping them
navigate and understand an unfamiliar, and perhaps hostile, legal system.
The Framers understood that all nations share a mutual interest in defending the rights
of their citizens while they spend time outside of their home country.99 Moreover, the
Constitution provides the Judicial Branch the authority to review cases concerning this
issue. 100
The United States has a long history of using diplomatic channels to achieve the
release of American citizens imprisoned overseas.' 1 Because numerous United States
citizens were imprisoned in foreign nations without due process, Congress enacted the
Protection of Citizens Abroad statute in 1868.102 Notably, President of the International
Court of Justice, U.S. jurist Stephen M. Schwebel, commented that "the citizens of no
State have a higher interest in the observance of those [consular notification] obligations
than the peripatetic citizens of the United States." 103 The Supreme Court also
98. Brief for American Citizens Abroad, supra note 60, at 2.
99. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(discussing the "Powers of the Judiciary"). Hamilton stated:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be accompanied with
the faculty of preventing it. As the denial or pervasion ofjustice by the sentences
of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reasons classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of
all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned.
Id. at 475.
100. See Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809) (noting that
federal courts have been given Article III jurisdiction over treaty claims so that "all persons who
have real claims under a treaty should have their causes decided by the national tribunals"); cf
Maldonado v. State, 998 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("Under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, states must adhere to United States treaties and give
them the same force and effect as any other federal law.").
101. See Brief for American Citizens Abroad, supra note 60, at 4 (discussing the history of
the United States "exerting diplomatic efforts at the highest level to secure the release of
American citizens unjustly imprisoned overseas"); see also Meade v. United States, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 691, 693 (1869) (noting that the imprisonment in Spain of American citizen Meade in
1816 came to an end when he was "finally released only by reason of the active interposition of
the government of the United States in his behalf').
102. See 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) (Protection of Citizens Abroad) (derived from act of July
27, 1868, ch. 249, Sec. 3, 15 Stat. 224) (detailing the responsibilities of the President when a
United States citizen is detained abroad without due process).
103. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Reports 1998 (Order
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recognized that the same rights afforded the United States by other countries
should be reciprocally afforded to foreign countries.' 4 In this vein, the
Presidential Memorandum follows the historical policy of the United States in
securing the rights of American citizens detained in foreign countries. 0 5
Continuing the longstanding American policy remains necessary because
failing to enforce the VCCR within the United States may "have grave
consequences for U.S. citizens abroad." 106 American Citizens Abroad spoke to
this point when they stated:
In a legal system that has no independent enforcement mechanism, the
integrity of the process depends on nothing less than the acceptance of
mutually shared obligations. Behind this acceptance is the essential lesson
of diplomatic experience: so long as they are able, nations will respond in
kind to the treatment they receive. This notion of reciprocity is both an
inescapable reality and the animating force to a bedrock principle of
international law-pacta sunt servanda ("pacts must be observed")-which
captures the requirement that nations must comply with their agreements in
good faith. 0 7
The State Department estimates that "[a]pproximately 3.2 million Americans
reside abroad, and Americans make about 60 million trips outside the United
States each year."10 8 Over a million United States citizens reside in Mexico,
representing the largest expatriate American community in any country.'0 9 The
protection of American citizens residing in Mexico must have contributed to
President Bush's decision to author the Presidential Memorandum.
of Apr. 9), Declaration of President Schwebel.
104. See The Bello Corrunes, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 152, 168 (1821) (understanding that
foreign nations must protect the rights of their citizens facing prosecution in the United States,
the Court held that "[t]he long and universal usage of the Courts of the United States has
sanctioned the exercise of this right, and it is impossible that any evil or inconvenience can flow
from it").
105. See Brief for American Citizens Abroad, supra note 60, at 7 (noting that the
Presidential Memorandum continues the "unbroken policy" of the United States concerning
American citizens detained in a foreign country).
106. See id. at 13 (discussing the consequences of the United States not providing
"[v]igorous and [r]obust [e]nforcement of the Vienna Convention").
107. Id.
108. BUREAU OF REs. MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2003 PERFORMANCE AND
AccOUNTABILrrY REPORT 141 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization
/29923.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
109. See Ass'n of Americans Resident Overseas, Top 10 Countries Outside the US. Where
Most Americans Live, http://www.aaro.org/map.html (last visited June 7, 2006) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review) (documenting the top ten countries outside the U.S. where
most Americans live). The Association of Americans Resident Overseas estimates 4.1 million
Americans reside abroad. Id.
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2. The Effective Conduct of Foreign Relations
Because states often did not abide by treaties under the Articles of
Confederation, 0 the Framers authored treaty power"' to try to mandate state
compliance." 2 Reassigning the treaty power became necessary when foreign
skepticism of the Continental Congress's authority over the states resulted in
the inability to finalize commercial treaties. 13  Within a decade of the
Constitution's ratification, the Supreme Court upheld the Framers' notion of
national treaty power by enforcing the provisions of federal treaties.1 4 In 1942,
the Court confirmed that:
If state action could defeat or alter our foreign policy, serious consequences
might ensue. The nation as a whole would be held to answer if a State
created difficulties with a foreign power .... No State can rewrite our
foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively." 
5
As recently as 2000, the Court noted that effective conduct of foreign relations
relies upon the federal government providing a congruent foreign policy to the
international community. "1
6
Jos6 Ernesto Medellin represents the current face of human rights
campaigns vehemently fighting against the United States' persistent practice of
convicting, sentencing, and executing foreign nationals without the benefit of
110. See FREDERICK W. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1973) (detailing the motivations of the Constitutional
Convention); David M. Grove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1102-49 (2000)
(describing the history of treaty making).
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
112. See Brief for Former United States Diplomats, supra note 23, at 8-9 (describing the
situation under the Articles of Confederation where the United States found itself "ultimately
dependent on the good faith of the states to carry out" treaty obligations).
113. See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 66 (4th ed.
1955) (describing the failure of "negotiations with other powers" because of "the growing
ineptitude and powerlessness of the Confederation to enforce its treaties against the thirteen
component states").
114. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 235, 239 (1796) (holding that under the
Supremacy Clause, the Treaty of Peace trumped a conflicting Virginia statute). The Court noted
that "a treaty cannot be the supreme law of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of
a State Legislature [or constitution or court] can stand in its way." Id. at 236.
115. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1942).
116. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 377 (2000) ("Quite simply,
if the [state] law is enforceable the President has less to offer and less economic diplomatic
leverage as a consequence.")
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consular assistance." 7 Taking steps identical to those taken by United States
diplomats on behalf of American citizens, foreign allies have repeatedly
asserted that the United States must comply with the VCCR and the ICJ." 8
President Bush has experienced the repercussions of alleged VCCR violations
concerning Mexican nationals throughout his presidency.' 9 Both Canada and
117. See, e.g., Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals: Earlier News From
Human Rights Research, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=3 1 &did=579 (last
visited June 7, 2006) (reporting the recent developments in the area of consular notification
enforcement inside the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See, e.g., Ginger Thompson, An Execution in Texas Strains Ties with Mexico and
Others, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at A6 (detailing a call from President Vicente Fox of
Mexico); Jonathan Tepperman, Faulder: The Long-Term View, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Dec. 11,
1998 (describing the efforts of the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister and Ambassador on behalf
of Canadian citizens); Laure LaFay, World Court-U.S. to Halt Execution, VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Apr. 10, 1998, at Al (detailing protests by Mother Teresa, Pope John Paul II, and the Italian
government to execution of Italian citizen); Somini Sengupta, Appeal in Murder Cites
International Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at B5 (reporting the contents of a letter from
Ecuadorian Consul General); David Schwartz, Plan to Execute German Killers Attracts
Scrutiny, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 22, 1999, at A l (reporting requests from then-German
President Herzog, Chancellor Schroeder, Foreign Minister Fischer, and Ambassador Chrobog
urging clemency from President Clinton and Arizona Governor Hull).
119. See, e.g., Mexico's Fox Cancels Meeting with Bush, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 15,
2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,60454,00.html (last visited June 7, 2006)
(reporting that Mexican President Vicente Fox canceled a scheduled visit to President Bush's
Texas ranch because Texas proceeded with the execution of Javier Suarez Medina despite
President Fox's assertion that Medina's VCCR rights were violated) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Fox News reported:
[T]he slight came as the once-warm relationship between the Fox and Bush
administrations already was suffering from a series of disagreements. Fox had
made several appeals to U.S. authorities to pardon Javier Suarez Medina, who he
said was a Mexican national. He said Suarez was never told he could contact the
Mexican consulate for help after his 1988 arrest, violating the 1963 Vienna
Convention of Consular Relations ....
Fox is the most pro-U.S. president in recent Mexican history, but his critics say
U.S. officials still shrug off his requests and ignore Mexican interests on important
issues.
The execution-and the government's last-ditch efforts to stop it-dominated
headlines across Mexico, where photographs of and interviews with the round-
faced, innocuous-looking Suarez turned up in most newspapers and on major
television stations.
Id.; BBC News, Mexico's Fox Cancels Texas Trip, Aug. 15, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/americas/2194566.stm (last visited June 7, 2006) (reporting that President Fox
canceled his scheduled trip to Bush's Crawford ranch following a phone call to President Bush
where the Mexican leader made "a last-ditch attempt to secure a stay of execution") (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Mexico have publicly stated that the inability of states to meet VCCR
requirements has "strain[ed]" bilateral relations. 1
20
Although the United States government consistently asserts the importance
of affording consular assistance rights within America,' 2 1 persistent state
violations of VCCR requirements significantly harm the ability of the United
States to form foreign policy alliances with other "governments and
international organizations."' 122  Non-compliance with President Bush's
Memorandum "would significantly impair the credibility of American
diplomats in the international arena.' 23 Resembling the noncompliant state
actions the Framers sought to end, state violations of the VCCR pose a
substantial threat to the effective conduct of foreign affairs. 124 Former United
States diplomats note: "International disapproval of our noncompliance with
the Vienna Convention has also deflected attention away from serious human
rights abuses in other countries and has provided our adversaries with
120. See Raymond Bonner, U.S. Bid to Execute Mexican Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2000, at A20 (discussing the remarks of Jorge G. Castaneda, foreign policy advisor to Mexican
President Fox); see also Colin Nickerson, Canadians Protest a Texas Execution; Inmate Set to
Die for 1975 Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 10, 1998, at A2 (discussing the remarks of Canadian
government officials in regards to the execution of Canadian citizen Stanley Faulder).
121. See supra Part III.A. 1 (describing the need to afford foreign nationals VCCR rights
within the United States in order to receive similar treatment of American citizens abroad).
122. See Brief for Former United States Diplomats, supra note 23, at 7 (detailing the
hardships American diplomats experience because states ignore VCCR requirements). The
former United States diplomats stated:
Texas's and other states' persistent practice of ignoring the Vienna Convention
obligations has strained bilateral and multilateral relations, and has disrupted
important national foreign policy interests by impairing the ability of diplomats to
carry out critical initiatives with foreign governments and international
organizations.
Id. The amici signatories served as "Senior State Department Officials, Ambassadors, and Legal
Advisers to the U.S. Department of State, representing the government of the United States at
home and abroad in both Republican and Democratic administrations." Id. at 3. Although the
signatories do not agree on the possibility of lawful administration of the death penalty, the
ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention or the validity of President Bush's unilateral
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, all signatories agree that United States courts should
abide by President Bush's Memorandum. Id. at 3-4.
123. See id. at 4 (asserting that non-compliance with the Presidential Memorandum would
harm the ability of American diplomats to give their word).
124. See Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 674 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In this
country, the individual States' (often confessed) noncompliance with the treaty has been a
vexing problem ... [which] may have considerable ramifications."); Brief for Former United
States Diplomats, supra note 23, at 16-17 (arguing that persistent state noncompliance with
VCCR requirements will result in alienation of foreign allies, "undermine America's credibility
as a global leader and seriously hinder foreign policy objectives at a critical time in our nation's
history").
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diplomatic ammunition to raise doubts about the sincerity of our commitment to
human rights."'
25
Relations with adversarial nations do not represent the only area in which
the conduct of effective foreign policy has suffered. Close allies often find
themselves in a position where they must challenge the United States' actions
rather than exert effort and time negotiating agreements beneficial to all
parties.' 26 Finally, diplomats overseas have even encountered threats to their
physical wellbeing because the United States has executed foreign nationals
who were denied consular assistance.127 In sum, the historic goal of promoting
effective foreign relations and the future goal of protecting American citizens
support President Bush's memorandum.
3. The Rule of Law in the International Community
The United States remains a party to the United Nations Charter.128 States
that are parties to litigation under the Charter recognize its legitimacy by
respecting the judgments of the ICJ.'29 Nations are able to publicize and
resolve particularly contentious issues through use of the ICJ.130 Compliance
with the Avenajudgment provides the international community with proof that
the United States will reciprocate the treatment it demands of other nations."'
125. Brief for Former United States Diplomats, supra note 23, at 20-21.
126. See id. at 22 ("In Amid's experience, an inordinate proportion of important bilateral
and multilateral meetings with our closest allies are now consumed with answering diplomatic
demarches challenging these practices, diverting attention away from our core national foreign
policy interests.").
127. See id. (describing "public hostility," "persistent criticism in the press and angry
demonstrations in front of U.S. embassies abroad"). Amici further stated: "Such protests have
not only seriously disrupted important diplomatic missions, but have even threatened the
physical safety of our U.S. diplomats and embassy staff trying to work in these countries." Id.;
see also U.S. Boosts Security in Honduras as Tempers Flare, REUTERS, Apr. 24, 1998
(describing public demonstrations in front of the U.S. embassy in Honduras requiring armed
security).
128. U.N., Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, Charter of the
United Nations, http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbiblelpart/chapter/
treatyl.asp. (last visited on Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. U.N. Charter, Article 94 ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
130. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the ICJ adjudication
concerning United States hostages in Iran). When the United States military mistakenly downed
an Iranian civilian airliner, killing 190 passengers and crew, despite strained diplomatic
relations, Iran decided to use the peaceful method of bringing a suit to the ICJ. Aerial Incident
of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 132 (Dec. 13).
131. See Brief for Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 66, at 4 (discussing the need for
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In contrast, state violations of the VCCR repeatedly provided ammunition for
other nations looking to question the United States' commitment to the rule of
law in the international community. 32 State failures to enforce the VCCR
support the argument that the United States treats international law as an
avenue solely for protecting American interests. 133 Moreover, international
accusations of American "hypocrisy" gain credence from the current
administration's public touting of the importance of international law.
34
Conflicts between the United States government's international law
rhetoric and state violations of VCCR rights undermine the objective of
signing international treaties. 35 If the United States intends to adhere to its
reciprocity in international treaty enforcement, amici commented that, "[i]n the long term,
countries will not provide foreign nationals with consular notice under the Convention if the
same protection is not accorded to their own citizens abroad").
132. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Mexican Killer Is Refused Clemency by Oklahoma, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21,2001, at A8 (quoting Mexican government officials stating that the execution of
Mexican national denied VCCR rights "is contrary to international law and the elemental
principles of cooperation between nations"); Roger Cohen, U.S. Execution of German Stirs
Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at A14 (quoting German Justice Minister stating that the
execution of two German nationals denied VCCR rights "is barbaric and unworthy ofa [nation]
based on the rule of law"); David Stout, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: U.S. Executions Draw
Scorn from Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 4 (Week in Review), at 4 (quoting Honduran
newspaper discussing the execution of Honduran national denied VCCR rights: "The most
powerful country in the world, which claims to be a stickler for justice and legal rectitude, has
violated its own precepts").
133. See Germany Sues U.S.for Breaking Law, REUTERS, Sept. 16, 1999 (quoting German
Justice Minister announcing LaGrand suit in the ICJ: "Respecting international laws cannot be
a one-way street").
134. See Transcript: Confirmation Hearing of Condoleezza Rice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2005 (quoting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement that, "[t]he United States
will ... continue to work to support and uphold the system of international rules and treaties
that allow us to take advantage of our freedom, to build our economies and to keep us safe and
secure"); cf Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies Are Not
Enough, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510271998 (May 1, 1998) (last visited
June 7, 2006) (reporting Paraguay's response to the execution of Breard). The Amnesty
International report stated:
No other US death penalty case in recent memory more tellingly reveals the glaring
double standard which exists between the United States' human rights rhetoric
abroad and its own domestic practices. The US government portrays itself as a
world leader in the protection of human rights and as a champion of international
law. Yet, when confronted with a unanimous opinion from the world's highest
court compelling its compliance, the United States chose instead to renege on its
binding treaty obligations .... [I]n the eyes of many members of the international
community of nations, any further attempt by the US government to boast about its
deep commitment to human rights protection will undoubtedly be seen as little
more than arrogant hypocrisy.
Id.
135. See Stephen Breyer & Antonin Scalia, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign
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own righteous rhetoric concerning international law, the enforcement of the
VCCR obligations provides a meaningful starting point. By enforcing the
Avena decision in United States courts, the President reaffirms the position
of America in the international legal community. He acknowledges not
only the United States' obligations but also the consequences of not
fulfilling them. Professor Henkin described the motivations of individual
nations to comply with international law when he stated:
[S]tates (and their officials) have moral commitments, reflecting the
ideology, the values, the "style" of their society, as well as some
awareness of, and respect for, world opinion .... States develop the
habit of compliance, and establish laws and institutions that make
compliance normal and routine. States recognize that stability, law and
order, reliability (and a warranted reputation for reliability) are in their
national interest, and therefore that they have a more-or-less
enlightened self-interest in compliance.1
36
Based on this analysis, the Presidential Memorandum's attempt to compel
compliance with the ICJ's judgment furthers the United States'
commitment to international law and circumscribes the individual states'
ability to undermine important international treaties and objectives.
B. Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol: Adopting Incongruence
Despite withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the United States has not
withdrawn from the VCCR.137 State Department Spokeswoman Darla Jordan
described the necessity for withdrawal by arguing that the United States
intended to protect "against future International Court of Justice judgments that
might similarly interpret the consular convention or disrupt [the United States']
Law for American Constitutional Adjudication at the American University School of Law (Jan.
13, 2005), http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm (last visited June 7,
2006) (quoting Justice Scalia) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Justice
Scalia stated:
[T]he object of a treaty being to come up with a text that is the same for all
countries, [the U.S. courts] should defer to the views of other signatories, much as
we defer to the views of agencies-that is to say if it's within the ballpark, if it's a
reasonable interpretation, though not necessarily the very best.
Id.
136. LouIs HENKiN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 49 (1995).
137. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 963 ("[T]he United States is still bound by its
obligations under the Convention. The effect of the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol,
therefore, is that the United States no longer avails itself of the ICJ's jurisdiction to interpret and
apply the Vienna Convention.").
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domestic criminal system in ways [the United States] did not anticipate when
[it] joined the convention." 138  In addition, Department of State Deputy
Spokesman Adam Ereli argued that:
[W]e're also saying in the future we're going to find other ways to resolve
disputes that come under the Vienna Convention other than submitting
them to the ICJ. We'll do something else. So we're still committed to the
Vienna Convention. We're still committed to upholding its principles and
fulfilling our obligations under that convention. What we are saying is
when there are questions about that, we'll seek to resolve them in a venue
other than the ICJ.
13 9
Despite the positive implications of the Presidential Memorandum, withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol troubles many scholars who support the ICJ as an
impartial international judicial body.140 State Department officials noted that
the Presidential Memorandum should ease the fears of other nations who
believe the United States will no longer face accountability for consular
assistance violations.' 4' However, the withdrawal seems to signify just that.
Specifically, withdrawal means an end to the ability of foreign nations to
implement ICJ suits alleging VCCR violations in order to challenge the United
States' criminal justice system.1
42
138. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases: Foes of Death Penalty Cite
Access to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at AO1.
139. Dep't of State Daily Press Briefing (Mar. 10, 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/dpb/2005/43225.htm (last visited on Oct. 22, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
140. See Lane, supra note 138 (quoting Professor Frederic Kirgis as stating: "It's
encouraging that the [P]resident wants to comply with the ICJ judgment [in the Mexicans'
case]. But it's discouraging that it's now saying we're taking our marbles and going home");
US. Withdrawals From World Court Protocol, INT'L SEC. AND RELATIONS NETWORK, Mar. 14,
2005, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfin?ID= 10927 (discussing the withdrawal) (last
visited June 7, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The article notes:
Some legal experts have expressed concern over the move. The New York Times
quoted Harold Hongju Koh, the dean of Yale's Law School, as saying that the Bush
administration's strategy was counterproductive, while Peter Spiro, a law professor
at the University of Georgia, characterized the withdrawal as "a sore-loser kind of
move. If we can't win, we're not going to play."
Id.
141. See Lane, supra note 138 (quoting State Department Spokeswoman Darla Jordan).
The Post reported: "Bush's decision to enforce the ICJ judgment in the case of the Mexicans
'should ensure that our withdrawal is not interpreted as an indication that we will not fulfill our
international obligations,' said Jordan of the State Department." Id.
142. See Marty Lederman, More on Medellin, Mar. 9,2005, http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2005/03/moreonmedelli.html (discussing withdraw from the Optional
Protocol) (last visited June 7, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Lederman comments:
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The recent use of the Optional Protocol to review allegations of VCCR
violations in American death penalty cases did not sit well with the Bush
administration. 143 The reasons offered for withdrawal, however, seem very
contrived for a number of reasons. First, the interpretation of the
convention offered by the ICJ should not have surprised the Administration
because it remains consistent with the progression of judgments since the
ratification of the Optional Protocol. The United States routinely has
ignored rulings that simply request compliance. The ICJ responded by
issuing provisional orders and judgments with increasingly stronger
wording. If an American citizen experienced criminal prosecution similar
to that experienced by Medellin, the United States government would agree
with an ICJ judgment similar to Avena against the nation prosecuting such
an American. Second, the disruption of United States courts remains
minimal. The Avena judgment simply notes current VCCR rights
violations by the states and allows domestic courts to decide what the
"review and reconsideration" mandate deems necessary. This posture
grants United States courts the opportunity to design an appropriate
remedy. Third, the Security Council veto option affords the United States
additional control over the ICJ adjudication process. 44  Finally, as
expressed in the previous section the decision to withdraw from the
Optional Protocol hinders the three historic purposes the State Department
offered for the Presidential Memorandum.
45
This might effectively mean the end to common litigation in which foreign
nationals convicted in state courts have challenged states' failure to provide them
an opportunity to contact their nations' consulates, as required by the Vienna
Convention itself. The... strategy last week in Medellin takes care of the 51 cases
that the 1CJ already has adjudicated, and the U.S.'s withdrawal from the treaty
presumably would preclude all future ICJ-based claims.
Id.
143. See Harris, supra note 46, at 6 ("More recently, however, the Optional Protocol had
been used as a tool to help fight against the death penalty by bringing cases before the ICJ
asserting the rights of foreign nationals sentenced to death in the United States."); Liptak, supra
note 47, at A16 (discussing the withdrawal from the Optional Protocol). Liptak reports: "The
memorandum... puzzled state prosecutors, who said it seemed inconsistent with the
administration's general hostility to international institutions and its support for the death
penalty. The withdrawal announced yesterday helps explain the administration's position." Id.
144. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Security Council veto
option).
145. See supra Part III.A (discussing the legitimacy of the Presidential Memorandum).
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1. Harming United States Citizens Abroad
Large numbers of United States citizens will continue to spend time
abroad. 146 Many of these Americans unfortunately will find themselves
facing the criminal justice system of another nation. 47 Withdrawal from
the Optional Protocol sharply contrasts with the historical United States
policy of pursuing all potential methods of protecting the rights of
American citizens while they spend time abroad. 48 Withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol has eliminated the only method of bringing claims
against foreign nations that detain United States citizens without affording
VCCR rights.1 49 This decision is striking because "in a time when the
administration is concerned with national security, it seems incongruous to
reject the one tribunal that can render a decision in Vienna Convention
cases." 150  United States citizens traveling abroad could face foreign
governments that copy the United States' conduct by trying American
citizens, convicting them, and sentencing them to death without notifying
the detained individual of their consular notification rights or notifying the
United States government of the proceedings. 5 Also, as stated previously,
nations adhere to international treaties because of a mutual recognition of
the importance of reciprocity.'5 2 Persistent state violations of VCCR rights,
combined with the inability of foreign nations to bring claims in the ICJ
against the United States for VCCR violations, will make it less likely that
foreign nations will honor the treaty, and, therefore, less likely that United
States citizens will receive their VCCR rights while abroad.'53
146. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (reporting on United States citizens
abroad).
147. See supra notes 96, 98 & 100 (reporting on United States citizens arrested abroad).
148. See supra notes 101-03, 105 and accompanying text (discussing United States'
history of protecting American citizens abroad).
149. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 963 ("The effect of the withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol, therefore, is that the United States no longer avails itself of the ICJ's
jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Vienna Convention.").
150. See id. at 974 (noting negative consequences of withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol). Aeschleman also comments that the "effect of the U.S. withdrawal may be serious,
because we can no longer avail ourselves of the ICJ's protections." Id. at 973; see also supra
note 103 and accompanying text (noting United States citizens' interest in observation of
consular notification obligations).
151. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 964 (noting worst case scenario for United States
citizens facing criminal prosecution in foreign nations).
152. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining how reciprocity upholds the
integrity of international treaty schemes).
153. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 974 (noting that reciprocity, or lack thereof,
1246
BROADENING EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE WAKE OF AVENA 1247
2. The Ineffective Conduct of Foreign Relations
Withdrawal highlights the hypocrisy of the United States' current
position. 154 Rather than mandating state compliance with consular notification
requirements, withdrawal notifies states that they will no longer face the burden
of ICJ judgments condemning their persistent VCCR violations.'" Withdrawal
notifies foreign nations that the only course of action they now possess comes in
the form of historically unsuccessful direct diplomatic channels. 56 Moreover,
state violation of consular notification rights, without the possibility of ICJ
review, will continue to harm the ability of American diplomats to pursue foreign
policy objectives.' 7 Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol only supports the
growing international chorus condemning the recent human rights record of the
United States.'
3. Abandoning the Rule of Law in the International Community
Although the Presidential Memorandum attempts to mandate compliance
with the Avena judgment, withdrawal indicates to the international community
that the United States no longer views the ICJ as positively resolving consular
notification controversies. 5 9  By rejecting the ICJ resolution process and
persistently violating consular notification requirements at the state level, the
United States tells the international community that it only values international
law when it favors the United States.' 60 Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
provides nations a powerful tool for VCCR noncompliance); see also supra notes 99-100, 106-
08 and accompanying text (discussing foreign nations refusing American citizens VCCR rights
if the United States does not enforce the VCCR).
154. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 973 ("This shows the world that the United States
wants the protections of the treaty, but that because of its consistent violations of the
Convention and its unwillingness to create a long-lasting remedy for all claimants, it does not
want to be under the jurisdiction of a court that can find such a violation.").
155. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (noting effective foreign policy
necessitates state compliance with international treaties).
156. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text (discussing unsuccessful diplomatic
attempts by foreign governments to gain consular notification rights for their citizens).
157. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties American
diplomats face because the United States lacks credibility in the area of VCCR compliance).
158. See supra note 134 (commenting on perceptions that the United States is not
committed to human rights).
159. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the ICJ in the
United Nations, past successes of ICJ adjudication, and positive effects of American compliance
with Avena).
160. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (noting repeated state VCCR
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further reaffirms the lingering international perception that the United States
does not respect the objectives of international agreements.1
61
In sum, this Part has explained why the policy reasons behind the
Presidential Memorandum are incongruent with the implications of the
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. First, the Department of Justice
outlined the historical and other legitimate policy considerations supporting the
Presidential Memorandum. Second, the Department of Justice offered
unconvincing reasoning to support withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.
Third, the implications of withdrawal significantly harm the legitimate and
historical policy considerations supporting the Presidential Memorandum. The
dual unilateral executive responses to the Avena decision form a dangerous,
disjointed, and hypocritical foreign policy.
IV Political Factors: Contributing to the Incongruence
Part IV examines the actions taken, or lack thereof, by the three
government branches that help form an incongruent foreign policy. First, it
demonstrates that the unilateral actions of the Executive Branch strategically
place the Administration in a position to broaden executive control over foreign
policy. Second, it discusses the lack of congressional response to the Bush
administration's unilateral actions. Third, it examines the Judicial Branch's
reluctance to rule on constitutional issues involving executive foreign relations
power.
A. The Battle over Foreign Affairs: Broadening Executive Power
The balance of power developed by the Framers and instituted by the
Constitution places the Executive and Legislative Branches in a continuous
struggle over the control of foreign affairs. 62 Aware of this fact, the Bush
administration's strategic responses to the Avenajudgment attempt to enhance
the President's foreign affairs power in two ways. The Presidential
violations and United States' rhetoric asserting preference for strong international law).
161. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text (explaining the objectives of signing
treaties and the ideology nations possess when they honor commitments to the international
community).
162. See TuSHNET, supra note 3, at 32 (discussing the struggle between the Executive and
Legislative Branches over foreign affairs); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Presidential powers are not fixed but
fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.").
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Determination asserts that the President, serving in his capacity as head
diplomat, possesses the constitutional authority to mandate compliance with the
Avena judgment in state criminal courts.1 63 Withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol produces further "practice and precedent" seemingly affirming the
President's power to unilaterally withdraw from treaties. 64 Although President
Bush's actions seem novel in many respects, they fall within historical foreign
policy tendencies that teach: "[W]hile Congress and others have debated, the
Presidents have acted."'1
65
1. The Presidential Memorandum 's Potential Effect
Although compliance with the Avena judgment appears to align with the
historical goals of United States foreign policy,' 66 accomplishment of this
objective through the Presidential Memorandum must face scrutiny in order to
uphold the "balanced power structure of our Republic.' 67  Indeed, the
Presidential Determination seeks to reverse the Clinton Administration's
position, namely, that the President possesses the power to request, but not to
mandate, state criminal court compliance with an ICJ holding. 68  Two
distinct constitutional arguments conflict with the Presidential
Memorandum. 69 First, "[n]o such power appears in Article II, and indeed
the President's only unilateral power over criminal convictions-the
Pardon Power-is carefully limited to federal crimes."'' 70 Second, "any
163. See Kirgis, supra note 25 (discussing implications of the Presidential Memorandum).
164. See DAVID GRAY ADLER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TERMINATION OF TREATIES 190-
91 (1986) (discussing legal arguments made by the Executive Branch concerning unilateral
treaty withdrawal despite the absence of constitutional text on the subject).
165. See LOFGREN, supra note 5, at 38 (noting historical executive actions in the area of
foreign policy); see also Michael M. Uhlmann, Reflections on the Role of the Judiciary in
Foreign Policy, in FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION 45 (Robert A. Goldwin & Robert A.
Licht eds., 1990) ("In short, the idea of the executive as set forth in the Constitution is not
exactly an experiment but it is something close to it.").
166. See supra Part III.A (explaining the legitimate purpose of the Presidential
Memorandum).
167. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,634(1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the need to scrutinize power exercised to accomplish desirable results,
not simply the end result alone).
168. See Brief for the United States, supra note 56, at 51 (examining measures the
Executive Branch may take under the Constitution).
169. See Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 3-4 (noting two constitutional arguments
against the Presidential Memorandum).
170. Id. at 3 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2). The Brief elaborated:
Moreover, since Youngstown the Supreme Court has recognized that the
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federal order to reconsider Medellin's case would violate principles of state
sovereignty by 'commandeering' the state courts."' 7' This argument stems
from the fact that the Supreme Court has never held that the Federal
Government can order state courts to hear federal claims despite the
existence of state laws barring jurisdiction of federal and state claims
alike. 172
Both state sovereignty and the Judicial Branch's authority to review
the legal effect of ICJ judgments face the power-usurping threat of a
mandatory reading of the Presidential Memorandum. 73  However, the
Judicial Branch's position seems a bit more precarious. Multiple Supreme
Court decisions have held that "[a]ny state action that conflicts with the
express foreign policy of the federal government is pre-empted. '
' 74
Because the decisions of state courts are deemed state action, 75 it would
appear that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals must comply with the
Presidential Memorandum.176 Further, if the Supreme Court finds that the
Presidential Memorandum necessitates compliance with the Avena
judgment, then the Executive Branch would achieve a novel and startling
broadening of unilateral executive power. 177
President's power is "at its lowest ebb" when he acts contrary to the will of
Congress. 343 U.S. at 648 (Jackson, J., concurring). Here, the federal habeas
corpus statute has carefully limited the situations under which federal authority will
reopen state criminal convictions, and that statute plainly bars relief here. A
mandatory reading of the President's Memorandum would thus fly in the face of
Congress's authority.
Id.
171. Id. at 4 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)).
172. See id. at 27 (examining the anticommandeering doctrine). Because reviewing the
anticommandeering doctrine deserves significant attention, this Note comments on the issue
simply to alert the reader of hurdles the administration must surmount to achieve a mandatory
reading of the Presidential Memorandum.
173. See Kirgis, supra note 25 (examining state sovereignty and the judiciary in the wake
of a binding interpretation of the Presidential Memorandum).
174. See id. (discussing Supreme Court precedents that may allow the Presidential
Memorandum to pre-empt decisions of the state courts); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (ruling that the express foreign policy of the United States may pre-
empt state action); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (same);
Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (same); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
233-34 (1942) (same); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1937) (same).
175. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that the decisions of state
courts are state actions).
176. See Kirgis, supra note 25 (examining the arguments in favor of mandatory state
compliance with the Presidential Memorandum).
177. See id. (examining the Presidential Memorandum's potential effect on Judicial
Branch). Professor Kirgis observed:
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Finally, the Presidential Memorandum may confuse the legal analysis
of the courts. 178 By authoring the Presidential Memorandum at the precise
time he did, 79 President Bush afforded the courts the ability to rule in favor
of compliance with the Avena judgment without basing such a ruling on an
understanding that the ICJ can bind domestic criminal proceedings.
Notably, the Presidential Memorandum determines that state courts should
comply with an ICJ judgment "in accordance with general principles of
comity." This wording becomes important because comity does not infer
any legal obligation. 180 It appears the Presidential Memorandum seeks to
bolster the foreign affairs power of the Executive Branch while
simultaneously allowing the courts to rule that ICJ judgments do not bind
domestic courts.
2. Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol: Further Practice
and Precedent
The question of whether the President possesses the power to
withdraw unilaterally from a treaty entered into with the advice and consent
of the Senate remains undecided by the Supreme Court. 8'1 Because of this
Perhaps he [Bush] meant that state courts are not legally required to give any ICJ
judgment immediate effect in U.S. domestic law in the absence of a determination
by the President. [If so], and if it is intended as a general statement extending
beyond the facts of the present case, there would be a separation-of-powers
question whether the President's foreign affairs authority under the Constitution
extends to determining the direct legal effect of ICJ judgments on domestic judicial
proceedings in the United States.
Id.
178. See Liptak, supra note 47 (discussing the integrated two-part strategy of the Bush
administration). Harold Hongju Koh, dean of the Yale Law School, analyzed the strategy by
saying: "Element... one was to take the bat out of the Supreme Court's hand." Id.
179. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (examining the Presidential Memorandum's
timing).
180. See Kirgis, supra note 25 ("'Comity' denotes a willingness to act in accordance with
good will and respect, but it does not denote a legal obligation to do what is contemplated.");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (8th ed. 2004) (defining judicial comity as the "respect a court of
one state or jurisdiction shows to another state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other's laws
and political decisions").
181. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (2002) (noting that when the Supreme
Court considered whether the President possesses the power to unilaterally terminate a treaty
none of the Justices' opinions "obtained a majority of votes," and thus, "there was no obviously
binding holding"). Despite the lack of a binding Supreme Court holding, many commentators
observe a general acceptance of unilateral treaty withdrawal. See also HENKiN, supra note 2, at
214 ("At the end of the twentieth century, it is apparently accepted that the President has
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judicial position, Democratic members of Congress challenged the Bush
administration's unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty. 182 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed this case, and it has not been appealed. Because the
constitutionality of unilateral treaty withdrawal remains undecided, it
makes strategic sense for the Executive Branch to continue accumulating a
lengthy record of unilateral treaty withdrawal to provide support for their
position in any future adjudication.
83
B. The Lack of Congressional Response
The Legislative Branch has not reacted officially to the unilateral
Executive responses to the Avena judgment. 184 The reasons for the current
lack of response are layered, and many of them necessarily involve political
concerns outside the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, a few potent
rationales must not be overlooked. The courts have not delivered a binding
interpretation of the Presidential Memorandum: Its precise meaning and
the validity of the Executive power behind the Memorandum have not been
commented on by the Supreme Court.185 Until the courts decide exactly what
the Presidential Memorandum asserts and requires, the Legislative Branch will
wait until action becomes necessary. In addition, deciding when and how to
challenge the constitutional authority of the President to withdraw unilaterally
from a treaty remains a delicate decision.'8 6 Finally, Republican congressional
authority under the Constitution to denounce or otherwise terminate a treaty.... ").
182. See Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (dismissing the complaint because plaintiffs did
not have standing and the issue raised a nonjusticiable political question).
183. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Addendum to ASIL Insight, President Bush's Determination
Regarding Mexican Nationals and Consular Convention Rights, Mar. 2005, http://www.
asil.org/insights/2005/03/insightsO5O3O9a.html (examining unilateral withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol) (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). This Note comments on the unanswered question of treaty withdrawal under the
domestic laws of the United States. However, the question of whether withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol is valid under international law remains unanswered. Id. This significant
question deserves more attention than this Note can afford. Thus, this Note does not comment
on the validity of withdrawal under customary international law. See also id. (noting customary
international laws and norms that may legitimize withdrawal from the Optional Protocol).
184. I have searched thoroughly for both official and unofficial congressional responses to
the unilateral executive responses to Avena. Shockingly, my research in this area produced no
meaningful results.
185. See infra note 201 (discussing the Supreme Court's agnostic position regarding the
constitutionality of the Presidential Memorandum).
186. See infra Part IV.C.2 (examining the unanswered question of who possesses the
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control makes a cohesive and effective response significantly more difficult. In
order to mount an effective congressional response to unilateral executive
action, congressional leaders must command the type of united front that does
not seem possible in connection with the President's responses to Avena.
C. Judicial Reluctance
Persistent judicial reluctance to provide precedent-setting rulings on
presidential foreign affairs power continues to vex those who oppose unilateral
executive power. 87 However, judicial hesitancy to become involved in foreign
affairs stems from numerous sources. 188 Primarily, many of the intelligence
issues involving foreign relations remain unknown to the Judicial Branch. 89 In
addition, the "training and experience" of Supreme Court Justices equip them
to deal with domestic issues, not foreign policy disputes.' 90 Further, foreign
policy disputes tend to fall along partisan lines.' 9' Finally, foreign affairs
disputes heighten the Judiciary's awareness of their own role in the
"constitutional scheme."' 92
constitutional authority to withdraw from a treaty).
187. See Uhlmann, supra note 165, at 42 ("The inhospitality of the courts, or at least of the
Supreme Court, to actions arising under the Constitution's foreign relations powers frustrates
many, especially professors and members of Congress in opposition to the president.").
188. See id. at 42-44 (noting reluctance in the Judicial Branch to rule on foreign affairs
issues).
189. See id. at 43 (discussing intelligence issues). Uhlmann wrote:
[International relations] is a world ruled by King Contingency, where caprice,
deceit, and passion dominate far more than order, honor, and reason. It is a world
where "ignorant armies clash by night"; a world where accurate information is hard
to come by and often secretly acquired; a world where the consequences of mistake
are long-lived and frequently fatal.
Id.
190. See id. (noting the nature of cases judges consider before confronting foreign policy
issues).
191. See id. ("[T]he more partisan, the more passionate, and the more passionate, the less
susceptible to resolution by the main instrument of the courts' power, namely, reason.").
192. See id. (citing approvingly ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184
(1962)) ("In the field of foreign relations, those interests may have less to do with the assertion
of power than with 'the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally
irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from."'); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 379 (1980) ("Nonetheless, since, as a functional matter, the
political branches are fully capable of protecting their own vital constitutional interests, the
Court will better secure its own critical constitutional role in our system by forcing them to do
SO.").
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1. Avoidance of the Key Issues in Medellin v. Dretke
Dismissing Medellin's writ as improvidently granted allowed the Supreme
Court to avoid producing a precedent-setting opinion. 193 Obviously, this did
not sit well with all of the Justices.194 The Supreme Court's five to four
dismissal in Medellin does not address the problems regarding the Avena ruling
and enforcement of the VCCR within the United States. 195 The brief per
curiam opinion, one concurrence, and three dissents, illustrates the Court's
inability to form a consensus on many of the issues relevant to Medellin.196 The
Court outlined five threshold issues that potentially restrict federal habeas relief
for Medellin. 197 However, in an almost open-ended invitation for future review
of the larger issues implicated, the Court noted:
Of course Medellin, or the State of Texas, can seek certiorari in this Court
from the Texas courts' disposition of the state habeas corpus application.
In that instance, this Court would in all likelihood have an opportunity to
review the Texas courts' treatment of the President's memorandum and
Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals... unencumbered
by the issues that arise from the procedural posture of this action.
98
Although the Court positioned itself to revisit the authority of ICJ judgments
and the Presidential Memorandum, the conflicting preferences of the Justices
depict a Court divided on the proper method of adjudication. 199
In the portion of her concurrence joined by Justice Scalia, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the "Texas courts are now positioned immediately to
adjudicate" whether either the ICJ's Avena judgment or the Presidential
Memorandum form a basis for relief.200 Justice O'Connor's dissent displayed
193. See infra note 207 (noting the "lingering issues" not decided by the Court's dismissal
of the writ).
194. See infra notes 199, 201-07 and accompanying text (detailing the reservations of
many Justices).
195. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 939 (noting that Supreme Court dismissal did not
resolve the controversy surrounding Avena and persistent VCCR violations within the United
States).
196. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Leading Cases, 119 HARV. L. REv. 169,331-37
(2005) (examining the lack of agreement between the Justices and the range of potential issues
in Medellin).
197. See id. at 331 n.41 (noting the threshold issues discussed in the Supreme Court
opinion); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 664-66 (2005) (articulating the majority's
understanding of the threshold issues).
198. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 664 n.1.
199. See id. at 666-95 (articulating the concurring and dissenting Justices' positions); The
Supreme Court, supra note 196, at 332 (discussing the concurrence and dissents).
200. Medellin, 544 U.S. at 672 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
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dissatisfaction with the Court's sidestepping of the underlying issues
concerning foreign policy:
The Court dismisses the writ (and terminates federal proceedings) on the
basis of speculation: Medellin might obtain relief in new state court
proceedings-because of the President's recent memorandum about whose
constitutionality the Court remains rightfully agnostic, or he might be
unable to secure ultimate relief in federal court-because of questions
about whose resolution the Court is likewise, rightfully, undecided. These
tentative predictions are not, in my view, reason enough to avoid questions
that are as compelling now as they were when we granted writ of certiorari,
and that remain properly before this Court. It seems to me unsound to'
avoid questions of national importance when they are'bound to recur.2°'
Justice Souter's dissent expressed concern that the holding of the Texas courts
could nullify the Court's chance to take up the questions on which certiorari
was granted.2 °2 Additionally, he argued that Medellin's situation can be
distinguished from Breard203 because Medellin "presented a Vienna
Convention claim in the shadow of a final ICJ judgment."2°4 Finally, in a
dissent joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer emphasized that "Medellin's
legal argument that 'American courts are bound to follow the ICJ's decision in
Avena' is substantial. 20 5 Clearly, the Court recognizes the importance and
validity of the conflict between international law and the American judicial
system.20 6 But the Court's dismissal of the writ provides yet another example
201. Id. at 673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 691 (Souter, J., dissenting) Justice Souter's dissent stated:
Since action by the Texas courts could render moot the questions on which we
granted certiorari (not to mention the subsidiary issues spotted in the per curiam
and dissenting opinions), I think the best course for this Court would be to stay
further action for a reasonable time as the Texas courts decide what to do; that way
we would not wipe out the work done in this case so far, and we would not decide
issues that may turn out to require no action. We would, however, remain in a
position to address promptly the Nation's obligation under the judgment of the ICJ
if that should prove necessary.
Id.
203. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1998) (denying petition for habeas
corpus, certiorari, and leave to file a bill of complaint on the petition alleging prejudice based on
a failure to raise in state court the violation of rights under an international treaty).
204. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 692 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court appears to "avoid
questions of national importance" despite the fact that such issues will remain problematic in the
future); see also Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at i ("This case involves novel and
complex issues of international law, presidential authority, and federal preemption.").
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of the Supreme Court's refusal to resolve complex foreign policy questions.
Medellin presented the Court with the opportunity to voice their interpretation
concerning many of the complex legal issues involved in the case.
Nevertheless, these issues became obscured by the unique procedural posture of
the case, combined with the timing of the dual unilateral executive actions.
These developments created a situation in which the Court seems to invite
another writ after the Texas adjudication. However, the Court obviously
realizes that the Texas courts could very well negate the necessity to rehear the
case.
2. The Unanswered Treaty Withdrawal Question
Despite the obvious importance of determining where the constitutional
authority to withdraw from a treaty resides, the question remains unanswered.
The Supreme Court remanded the issue in Goldwater v. Carter208 without
207. See Weiland, supra note 19, at 687 (discussing the need for a cohesive response to
VCCR violations from the Supreme Court, the federal government, and the states). Weiland
argues that:
The Supreme Court's voice must be heard regarding these lingering issues: (1)
whether a petitioner's failure to raise Vienna Convention violations in previous
appeals results in a procedural default; (2) whether an individually enforceable
right is created by such violations; and (3) what is the scope [of] "review and
reconsideration" for such violations.
Id.
208. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,996 (1979) (granting certiorari, vacating the
lower courts judgment and remanding with directions to dismiss the complaint). In Goldwater,
the Supreme Court considered whether President Carter's action in unilaterally terminating the
defense treaty with Taiwan deprived Members of Congress of their constitutional role with
respect to a change in the supreme law of the land. Id. at 997-98. When the case was heard by
the Supreme Court, Congress had taken no official action in response to the unilateral treaty
termination of the Executive Branch. Id. at 998. The Court divided sharply on the propriety of
judicial involvement in the case. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, but filed a statement
arguing that the issue was not ripe for review. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997. Powell reasoned
that "a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless and
until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority." Id. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by three other Justices, concurred in the judgment, but filed a statement arguing that "the
basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is 'political' and therefore
nonjusticiable." Id. at 1002. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White, dissented in the
opinion, arguing: "I would set the case for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it
so obviously deserves." Id. at 1006. Finally, Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the ruling
of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed "insofar as it rests upon the President's well-
established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from foreign governments." Id.
The six Justices who agreed that the case should be dismissed could not agree on the reason for
this conclusion. Consequently, the Goldwater Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of
the lower court and remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint. Id.
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producing a binding holding.209 Goldwater presented the Supreme Court with
the issue of whether President Carter had the constitutional authority to
unilaterally terminate a defense treaty with Taiwan. In a classic case of the
Supreme Court avoiding the fray of foreign policy litigation, the case never
went to oral argument and only one Justice expressed an opinion on the
substantive issues.2 ° Claiming the case raised a nonjusticiable political
question, the plurality opinion got rid of the case without convincing enough
Justices to form a majority.211 In his concurrence, Justice Powell laid out the
political question doctrine: "[T]he doctrine incorporates three inquires:
(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the
Constitution to a coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of
the question demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?,
21 2
Justice Powell chose to view the political question doctrine narrowly,
arguing that "the suggestion that this case presents a political question is
incompatible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to decide
whether one branch of our Government has impinged upon the power of
another. 2 13 Implementing a broad understanding of the doctrine in the
plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist found that the "case is 'political' and
therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in the
conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or
the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President."214 Although
209. See supra note 181 (noting that the Goldwater Court did not provide a "binding
holding").
210. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CoNsTrruTioNAL DIPLOMACY 146-47 (1990) (discussing
the Goldwater case).
211. See Uhlmann, supra note 165, at 51 (examining the Supreme Court's handling of
Goldwater).
212. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962)). Justice Powell found that "the answer to each of these inquires would require
us to decide this case if it were ready for review." Id.
213. Id. at 1001.
214. Id. at 1002. In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that Justice Rehnquist "profoundly
misapprehends the political-question principle as it applies to matters of foreign relations." Id.
at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan stated:
Properly understood, the political-question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing
an exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to which
authority to make thatjudgment has been "constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." But the
doctrine does not pertain when a court is faced with the antecedent question
whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository
of political decision making. The issue of decision making authority must be
resolved as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion.
Id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13, 217
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Justice Rehnquist's position obtained four votes, changes to the Court make it
impossible to predict future review of treaty withdrawal under the political
question doctrine.2 15 Justice Powell concurred because he thought that the
issue was not yet ripe.2 16 He noted:
The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of
power between the President and Congress until the political branches
reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small
groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution
of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve
the conflict.217
Powell's analysis of the ripeness issue displays substantial foresight when one
considers the 2002 case of Kucinich v. Bush.218
(1962); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969)).
215. See Uhlmann, supra note 165, at 51 ("[Although] Rehnquist's position... came one
vote shy of commanding a majority of the Court,.. . [w]ith subsequent changes in membership
on the Court, it will be interesting to see whether his view will enjoy a richer life.").
216. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979).
217. Id. Testifying before the Foreign Relations Comm., Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld
described the potential for a constitutional impasse:
If, to take the strongest case, the Congress passed a joint resolution expressing its
desire that a treaty should remain in effect, the President vetoed that resolution, and
both Houses voted by two-third majorities to override the veto, I would think that
the President could act in accordance with his original intention only at the risk of
provoking a serious constitutional crisis.
Treaty Termination: Hearings on S. Res. 15 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th
Cong. 442 (1979) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld).
218. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (2002) (granting defendants' motion to
dismiss or alternatively, their motion for summary judgment). In Kucinich, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia considered the constitutionality of President Bush's
unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) without congressional
consent. Id. at 2. On Dec. 13, 2001, President Bush "gave Russia the requisite six-months
notice of the intention of the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty." Id. at 2-3.
"Before he withdrew from the Treaty, however, President Bush did not submit the question of
treaty termination to the Senate or the House." Id. at 3. Thirty-two members of the House of
Representatives brought a suit against President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld challenging the constitutionality of the unilateral
termination. Id. at 2. The court noted that "[n]one of the opinions in Goldwater obtained a
majority of votes, and hence no single rationale controls." Id. at 13. The Court held that the
Congressmen did not have standing to bring the suit because "plaintiffs have alleged only an
institutional injury to Congress, not injuries that are personal and particularized to themselves."
Id. at 18 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997)). Further, the Court concluded that the
"issue raised by these congressmen is a nonjusticiable political question." Id. Consequently,
"the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is granted, and
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied." Id.
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In Kucinich, thirty-two Democratic Congressmen filed suit in federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of President Bush's unilateral withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). 219  In another well-timed
maneuver, the Bush administration announced withdrawal from the ABM treaty a
little over a year after the September 1 lth terrorist attacks, operating under the
"well-developed convention that Congress does not oppose the [P]resident on
strategic issues during wartime. ''220  Democratic Senator Russell Feingold
introduced a nonbinding resolution asserting that the Senate did not approve the
withdrawal and requiring Senate approval for withdrawal. 22' Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch objected without offering an explanation, effectively blocking
consideration of the resolution.22 Notably, Senators Hatch, Jesse Helms, and
Strom Thurmond signed a 1979 resolution authored by Senator Barry Goldwater
opposing then-President Jimmy Carter's unilateral withdrawal from the mutual
defense treaty with Taiwan.223 That resolution called Carter's action "a dangerous
precedent for executive usurpation of Congress's historically and constitutionally
based powers. ''224 Apparently, in 2002, Senators Hatch, Helms, and Thurmond
no longer subscribed to that analysis. 25 Despite Senators of both major parties
219. Peter Weiss, Judge Bates' Decision in Kucinich v. Bush: Is the Glass Half Empty or
Half Full?, LAWYERS COMM. ON NUCLEAR POLICY, http://lcnp.org/pubs/BASpring03/article
5.htm (last visited June 7, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). President
Bush did not consult with the Congressmen represented in the suit before termination of the
ABM Treaty. Id. Peter Weis served as lead counsel for plaintiffs in Kucinich. Id.
220. Craig Eisendrath, Suing the President: Members of Congress Are Endeavoring to
Prevent Pres. Bush from Abrogating Treaties without Congressional Consent, USA TODAY
(SOC'Y. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF EDUC.), May 2003, http://www.findarticles.
com/p/articles/mim 1272/is_2696_131/ai_101497542 (last visited Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
221. See David Ruppe, ABM Treaty: US. Representatives Sue to Block Treaty
Withdrawal, GLOBAL SEC. NEWSWIRE, June 12, 2002, http://www.nti.org/dnewswire/
issues/2002/6/12/9s.html (last visited June 7, 2006) (discussing the nonbinding resolution
introduced by Senator Feingold) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
222. See id. (noting the response of Senator Hatch).
223. See id. (detailing the previous actions of Senators); see also ABM Treaty Still Lives,
Say Congressmen Who Sue to Undo its 'Unconstitutional' Knifing by Bush Without OK of
Congress, A WALL NEWS REPORT, June 21, 2002, http://warandlaw.homestead.com/
files/abmlives.htm (last visited June 7, 2006) ("Senators Hatch, Helms, and Thurmond were
plaintiffs in Goldwater v. Carter and still serve in the Senate today--but they support now what
they opposed then.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The WALL group
helped initiate the movement that resulted in the Kucinich suit. Id.
224. See Ruppe, supra note 22 l(reporting the text of the Goldwater resolution).
225. Noting the previous position of the Republican Senators should dispel the current
administration's argument that only "liberal Democrats" try to abridge the "inherent Presidential
power to act [unilaterally]." See Cheney, supra note 3, at 104-05, 119 (arguing in favor of
substantial inherent presidential powers).
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questioning the policy shift, no Senators joined the suit.226 Eventually, the
District Court dismissed the suit, basing the decision on either the Congressmen's
lack of standing or an implementation of the political question doctrine. In the
wake of Kucinich, it makes no sense to challenge the constitutionality of
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. Congressional leaders would struggle to
obtain standing; Powell's analysis in Goldwater suggests the current situation
would not pass a ripeness inquiry, and the potential for a majority of the Court to
apply the political question doctrine looms.
V. Perhaps Legal, but Ultimately Unconstitutional
The unilateral executive responses to the Avena judgment illustrate a
situation where the President may have acted legally, but nonetheless
unconstitutionally. First, this Part explores the relationship between
constitutionality and legality. Second, it analyzes the tendency towards excessive
legalism within the Executive Branch. Finally, it discusses the detrimental effects
of departing from the constitutional scheme in regards to the unilateral executive
responses to Avena.
A. Constitutionality and Legality
In his "Helvidius" letter, James Madison argued that "the president has the
power to conduct foreign relations but not to make foreign policy."2 27 Despite the
lack of direct constitutional text, careful analysis of the Framers' governmental
scheme reveals preferential treatment of congressional participation in the
formation of foreign policy.22s Numerous rationales support this position.
Specifically, when Congress takes part in the formation of foreign policy, it fills
229the gap between the Executive Branch and the will of the citizens. In
226. See ABM Treaty, supra note 223 (discussing Congressional reaction to unilateral
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty).
227. See HEWmKN, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting James Madison) (examining the distribution
of foreign affairs powers).
228. See KRAFTr, supra note 17, at 160-62 (discussing "Congressional Consultation and the
Logic of Democratic Theory"); Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-
Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 46,46-85 (Summer 1976)
(discussing the American government scheme).
229. See FRANcis 0. WI.cox, CONGRESs, THE EXECUTVE AND FOREIGN POLICY 12(1971)
("Call it intuition, call it horse sense, call it sound political judgment-legislators are invaluable
in helping to strike a tolerable balance between the idealistic and the practical, between the
views of experts and those of the general public. They help bridge an otherwise unbridgeable
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addition, the difficult process of garnering congressional consent assures the
contemplation of differing views, the resolution of conflicting interests into
coalitions, and the eventual formation of consensus. 3° Congressional
consultation also legitimizes executive decisions that occur within the
"constitutional twilight zone. 2 31 Finally, the Framers did not envision an easy
foreign policy-making relationship between the Executive and Legislative
Branches; 232 instead, they designed a contentious partnership in which no
individual or department of government possesses "exclusive authority to act on
behalf of the nation" without explicit constitutional authority.
233
Accepting that the Constitution presupposes foreign policy-making
cooperation between branches and that the Judiciary remains reluctant to speak
on the legality of unilateral executive action, scenarios emerge where the
President can act "legally, that is, within the black letter of the law, but
nonetheless unconstitutionally in the sense that his action is wholly destructive
of the norms of our constitutional scheme. 2 34 Two specific situations arise in
which it appears a constitutional duty should preclude the President from acting
unilaterally.2 35 First, when unilateral executive action will meet substantial
opposition from congressional leaders,236 and second, when the President
gap in the formulation of our foreign policy."). Increasing congressional involvement also
promotes the federal government's accountability to individual citizens. See BARRY
GOLDWATER, CHINA AND THE ABROGATION OF TREATiES, 277-305 (1979) (discussing the
advantages of reaching executive-legislative consensus on foreign affairs).
230. See Joel L. Fleishman & Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of
Presidential Legislation, 40 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 24-25 (Summer 1976) (noting the
advantages of congressional consultation, and asserting that "[m]ost importantly, we gain some
protection against arbitrary executive action"); see CHENEY, supra note 3, at 102 ("Congress was
intended to be a collective, deliberative body. When working at its best, it would slow down
decisions, improve their substantive content, subject them to compromise, and help build a
consensus behind general rules before they were to be applied to the citizenry.").
231. See Gewirtz, supra note 228, at 80-83 (discussing congressional consultation in light
of Youngstown). In his famous Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson states: "When the
President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
232. See supra note 3 (examining the intentions of the Framers).
233. See KRAFT, supra note 17, at 159-60 (discussing "Congressional Consultation and the
Logic of The Separation of Powers").
234. See id. at 162 (discussing constitutionality and legality).
235. See id. at 166 (discussing two scenarios where the President "has a constitutional
duty" not to exercise power unilaterally).
236. See id. (discussing the President's constitutional duties). The Bush administration's
now infamous "torture memo" and his unilateral authorization of the National Security Agency's
warrantless wiretapping of American citizens illustrate situations where President Bush did not
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knows unilateral executive action will "dramatically alter the course of U.S.
foreign policy. 237 The Presidential Memorandum and withdrawal from the
Optional Protocol fall into the second category.
The novel Memorandum asserts that the President's constitutionally based
foreign affairs powers authorize overriding state sovereignty, predetermining
judicial decisions, and acting contrary to the will of Congress. Despite valid
policy arguments, the Memorandum's unprecedented unilateral alteration of
domestic treaty enforcement tramples on the constitutional scheme and history.
Withdrawal from the Optional Protocol rejects the historic and "unbroken"
foreign policy of the United States. Careful analysis of the unilateral
withdrawal, in light of the policy arguments in favor of the Memorandum,
reveals the creation of an unfamiliar and dangerously incoherent foreign policy.
Finally, the Senate Judiciary Committee expressly rejected "[e]xecutive
supremacy in the making of foreign policy" when it argued that "[t]he means of
a democracy are its ends. When we set aside democratic procedures in making
our foreign policy, we are undermining the purpose of that policy.
238
B. "Can Do" Lawyers Within the Executive Branch
Telling one's client that he cannot do what he wishes to do is never pleasant
and especially not when the client is a President or a Secretary of State or a
Secretary of Defense. But given the various doctrines of standing, political
questions, mootness, ripeness and so on that tend to limit judicial scrutiny
of governmental acts in the international arena, I think it is important for
the State Department's Legal Adviser, the Defense Department's General
fulfill his constitutional duty in the face of substantial, bi-partisan Congressional opposition.
David Cole, Reviving the Nixon Doctrine: NSA Spying, the Commander-in-Chief and
Executive Power in the War on Terror, 13 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. (forthcoming
2006) (discussing the wiretapping and torture controversies). Responding to the avalanche of
criticism concerning these unilateral policies, the Administration uniformly sticks to novel legal
interpretations of the President's Commander-in-Chief authority despite "contrary...
constitutional text and history." Id. at 17.
237. See KRAFr, supra note 17, at 166 (discussing the President's constitutional duties).
238. S. Rep. No. 91-129, at 8-9 (1969); S. Rep. No. 90-797, at 7-8 (1967); see KRAr,
supra note 17, at 167 (highlighting the Senate Judiciary statement as "perhaps the most
important lesson" of the controversy surrounding Carter's unilateral actions). Cf. Cole, supra
note 236 (noting that the controversy surrounding the NSA wiretapping programs does not stem
from the valid goal of intercepting Al Qaeda communications, but instead came from the "way
the administration went about putting the program in place" and its implications on the "system
of checks and balances so central to our constitutional democracy").
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Counsel, and the Attorney General to appreciate their semi-judicial function
in the foreign affairs field.239
In 1979, Andreas F. Lowenfeld, previously a five-year member of the Legal
Advisor's Office in the State Department, made this statement before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 240  His insights into the role of
Executive Branch legal analysts reveal a few key points. Thorough judicial
review of foreign affairs decisions occurs infrequently.241 Moreover, the lack
of judicial review means that Executive Branch lawyers need "to take
seriously their duties to interpret and carry out the Constitution ... not to act
as 'can do' lawyers. 2 42 Further, interpreting and carrying out the
Constitution, the "semi-judicial function," requires Executive Branch lawyers
to recognize that the constitutional scheme necessitates "consultation and
accommodation among the several branches of government." 243 Finally,
acknowledging this constitutional duty does not seem particularly difficult;
nevertheless, Executive Branch legal analysts persistently under-appreciate
its importance. 2"
Legal analysts for the Bush administration routinely offer novel and
controversial legal interpretations to validate unilateral executive action
involving foreign affairs.245 Executive Branch legal analysts can offer such
interpretations of presidential foreign affairs powers because the
"Constitution confers authority over foreign affairs and national security,
239. Hearings, supra note 217, at 432-33 (testimony of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld).
240. Id. at 430-43.
241. See id. at 432 ("[T]he likelihood of meaningful judicial review is much smaller with
regard to governmental action in the foreign affairs area than with regard to other aspects of
governmental activity."); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) ("[The
decisions of the Court in [foreign affairs] have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential
value for subsequent cases.").
242. Hearings, supra note 217, at 432 (testimony of Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld).
243. See id. at 433, 443 (discussing the balance of foreign affairs power between the
Executive and Legislative Branches).
244. Id. at 432 ("I am no longer as ready to assert as I once was [while serving the
Executive Branch] that the magic words 'foreign affairs' or 'national security' mean a wider
scope of delegation to the Executive Branch and a narrower duty to report to the Congress than
is the case with respect to domestic affairs.").
245. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the innovative nature of the Presidential
Memorandum and the legal hurdles it must surmount); Jess Bravin, Pentagon Report Set
Framework For Use of Torture: Security or Legal Factors Could Trump Restrictions, Memo to
Rumsfeld Argued, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2004 (discussing the "legal loopholes" the Executive
Branch lawyers insist permit torture); Cole, supra note 236 (noting that President Bush's legal
defense for unilateral NSA wiretapping "has taken overly aggressive [legal] positions that
unnecessarily run roughshod over fundamental principles of the rule of law").
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with few exceptions, to the political branches, creating the risk that judicial
intervention will itself be a serious violation of separation of powers.
' 246
Unlike domestic cases, where the Supreme Court relies heavily on its own
constitutional interpretation, the Court routinely welcomes the constitutional
interpretation of the political branches in foreign affairs cases.247 Searching
for innovative legal arguments supporting unilateral executive action, "can
do" lawyers miss the constitutional nuance that Professor Lowenfeld only
grasped in retrospect. 248  Executive lawyers should not jump to the
conceptual question of whether the President possesses the legal authority to
act unilaterally in foreign affairs. 249 Instead, the initial inquiry should focus
on the "normative" question of whether the President must exercise unilateral
power without "meaningful" congressional participation.5 0 Whether the
President can legally proceed in a unilateral fashion does not take into
account the political circumstances surrounding the timing of such a
decision. In contrast, the latter inquiry necessitates consideration of the
congressional posture, the demand for prompt action, the pursuit of a
singular, cohesive foreign policy, and the upholding of the cooperative
constitutional scheme.252
C. Abandoning the Constitutional Scheme
The Founding Fathers designed the presidency as a one-man office able to
act on a moment's notice. In contrast, Congress must act as a collective,
deliberative group of representatives focused on building consensus before
implementing new laws and policies. This distinction highlights the critical
246. See Powell, supra note 90, at 537 (discussing the reluctance of the Supreme Court to
interpret the Constitution in the area of foreign relations).
247. See id. (discussing the Supreme Court's policy of inviting the political branches to
interpret the Constitution in the area of foreign relations).
248. See KRAFT, supra note 17, at 166 ("[T]he search for a legal resolution to these
constitutional controversies has obscured the relevant focus of inquiry in cases of this nature.").
249. See id. (discussing the mistake of approaching unilateral presidential exercise of
foreign policy making power as an "abstract legal question").
250. See id. (arguing that executive lawyers should examine whether the specific scenario
necessitates presidential action without congressional involvement).
251. See id. (noting the drawbacks of"can do" legal analysis within the Executive Branch).
To prevent unilateral executive action, political circumstances would have to reach a
constitutional impasse. However, this situation has never arisen and hopefully never will.
252. See id. (discussing the advantages of resisting a strictly legalistic examination of the
President's unilateral foreign affairs authority).
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role the President must play during times of international crises.2 3  The
preeminent role of the President in these dire international situations stems
from the Founders' awareness that "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch
will generally characterize the proceedings of one man. '254 Nevertheless, in
situations where dramatic foreign policy decisions do not involve imminent
danger or demand secrecy, congressional "[a]mbition should be made to
counteract [executive] ambition., 255 In the wake of the Avena decision the
United States found itself in the latter situation. Mexico did not file suit in the
ICJ because it sought to "work actively against our interests. ' 25 6 Rather,
Mexico simply wanted the United States to afford its citizens the VCCR rights
Mexico affords Americans. Thus, the Bush administration should have utilized
all three branches of government to address the problem of persistent state
VCCR violations. Instead, the unilateral responses to Avena place executive
ambition above the constitutional scheme of government. This subpart
examines some of the negative consequences of employing unilateral executive
action when the situation does not mandate such a response.
Medellin provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to review the
United States obligation to adhere with the final ICJ judgment in Avena.257 The
253. See Cheney, supra note 3, at 121 (discussing international situations that necessitate
immediate executive action). Cheney argues:
Securing rights means, among other things, preserving the government's ability to
respond internationally to countries that may want to harm us. In the face of
danger, a tilt toward inaction... would help those foreign powers who want to
endanger it. That is why the Constitution allowed a much greater scope for
executive power in foreign than domestic policy.
Id.
254. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
("The Executive Department Further Considered").
255. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 318-20 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003)
(discussing the structure of government and the preference for the proper checks and balances
between different departments).
256. See Cheney, supra note 3, at 121 (discussing international situations where immediate
executive actions become necessary). Disturbingly, in the recently released National Defense
Strategy, the Bush administration seems to associate legal challenges to United States policies
with terrorism. National Defense Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, DEP'T OF DEFENSE 5,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa-mar2005.htm
(last visited June 7, 2006) (arguing under the heading "Our Vulnerabilities" that "[o]ur strength
as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak
using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
257. The opportunity to review the final ICJ judgment in Medellin was novel because
previous ICJ holdings concerning United States VCCR violations only carried the status of
provisional orders requesting stays of execution. See supra Part. II.A (discussing Avena); Part
II.D (discussing Medellin).
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issues presented to the Court in Medellin did not include the legality and effect
of the Presidential Memorandum. 258 The Presidential Memorandum caught the
Court off guard, producing a procedurally based dismissal because the issues
for which it granted certiorari were no longer clearly defined. 259 Although this
outcome precluded the Court from finding that a final ICJ judgment bound
domestic criminal courts,260 allowing the Court to rule on the original issues
may have produced the most favorable result.26' Ruling on just the narrow
issues presented, the Court could have mandated compliance without
expanding the holding beyond the Avena decision.262 Further, if the Court
based such a ruling on comity, the ICJ judgment would not bind domestic
courts. A broader ruling would overturn Breard by determining that the
procedural default doctrine does not apply in cases where VCCR violations
occurred.263 In that scenario, the Administration would possess a much more
plausible basis for withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. However, the fact
remains that the Supreme Court did not rule on Medellin, and the substantial
issues presented in that case remain undecided. By detrimentally influencing
the judicial process, the Executive Branch eliminated a brief opportunity to
clarify the VCCR violation issue, leaving state courts confused as to the proper
method of adjudication.2 4
Apart from forming an incongruent foreign policy concerning VCCR
rights, the Bush administration missed a unique opportunity to advocate
congressional action.265 Such legislation could take various forms. Congress
could amend the federal habeas corpus statute so that the procedural default
doctrine would not apply to VCCR violations if the doctrine eliminated the
258. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law: Supreme Court
Dismisses Texas Death Penalty Case Considered by ICJ, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 889, 889 (2005)
(noting the Supreme Court's unprepared stance concerning the legality of the Presidential
Memorandum).
259. See id. (discussing the Court's dilemma because of the "unusual situation following
President George W. Bush's" Memorandum).
260. It seems likely that the Bush administration wanted to avoid this outcome at all costs.
261. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 979 (discussing the potential Supreme Court ruling
in Medellin).
262. See id. (noting the potential for a narrow holding affording compliance).
263. See id. (examining the potential for a broad ruling).
264. The differing results in the Oklahoma and Texas criminal courts illustrate the uneven
administration ofjustice that will continue because of this missed opportunity. Seesupra notes
47-50 (discussing the reactions of Texas and Oklahoma).
265. See Aeschleman, supra note 14, at 978 (discussing the potential for legislation aimed
at avoiding future ICJ inquires).
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potential for "review and reconsideration" of VCCR claims. 266  Altered
Miranda warnings could include consular notification at the time of arrest.
Although this approach would prove difficult because of the deliberate nature
of Congress, 267 it could negate future ICJ inquiry without precluding the United
States from raising VCCR claims in the ICJ on behalf of American citizens
detained abroad. Unfortunately, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol
stripped the United States of the international judicial tool it created.
Finally, the expansion of executive foreign affairs power asserted in the
Presidential Memorandum could prove devastating to the rights of states.
268
Supreme Court precedent establishes that an existing executive agreement on
foreign policy can preempt conflicting state law.269 In contrast, the Presidential
Memorandum contends that by invoking foreign affairs, the President's
exercise of power preempts state law despite the absence of a specific bilateral
obligation.270 This assertion potentially overwhelms state sovereignty because
"a wide variety of unilateral initiatives by the President could be linked to some
putative source in treaties or customary international law.",271 One of the most
internationally contentious rights held by states, the right to pursue the death
penalty,272 could face the danger of presidential preemption based on promoting
foreign policy interests. 273  While fruition of this ironic situation seems
unlikely,274 expansion of presidential foreign affairs powers could result in
266. See id. (discussing potential habeas corpus reform).
267. See id. (commenting on the difficulty of pursuing congressional action). At a time
when Republican leadership controls Congress, this option seems much more plausible.
268. See Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 21 ("The claimed power is subject to no
limiting principle, and acknowledging it would give the President an essentially unlimited
ability to preempt state law based on the assertion of foreign-affairs interest.").
269. See Am. Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003) ("The express federal
policy and the clear conflict raised by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to
yield.").
270. See Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 22 ("Without a limitation to specific
bilateral obligations, the President could preempt state law based on nothing more than a
general statement to tie the preemption to some treaty.").
271. Id.
272. See Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death
Penalty, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1085, 1105 (2002) ("[T]he United States' adherence to the
death penalty has become a growing irritant with other nations .... Increasingly, this issue has
placed America and Europe on a collision course in almost every multilateral human rights
forum .... Inevitably, these differences have begun to warp U.S. foreign policy.").
273. See Brief for the States, supra note 16, at 23 ("If the United States is right about the
scope of presidential power in the present case, then there is no principled theory that would
foreclose unilateral presidential abolition of state death penalty statutes based on his finding that
abolition was in keeping with the United States' foreign policy interests.").
274. This situation would produce irony because the Bush Administration's pro-death
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subsequent administrations negating the painstaking foreign relations work of
previous administrations.275
VI. Conclusion
The Constitution contains sparse text concerning foreign policy-making
power. Whether they intended it or not, the Framers created a governmental
scheme where the two political branches struggle over the power to set foreign
policy.2 76 In the wake of Avena, the Bush administration's dual unilateral
actions intensified this struggle by claiming unprecedented control over foreign
affairs. The President's unilateral actions encroached upon state sovereignty,
trampled the Judicial Branch's authority to consider the issues implicated in
Medellin, negated Congress's ability to enact effective legislation, and
disregarded the advantages of congressional participation in foreign affairs.
This Note explains why the historic policy considerations offered in
support of the Presidential Memorandum are incongruent with the
consequences of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.277 It comments on
how incongruence results from executive ambitions favoring broader unilateral
foreign affairs power, the lack of congressional response, and judicial
reluctance in the area of foreign affairs.278 In addition, this Note argues that the
President's unilateral actions may be legal, but are nonetheless,
unconstitutional.279 Specifically, the courts may not rule on the legality of the
executive actions; however, the President disregarded the constitutional
preference for cooperative foreign policy-making.
In many regards the President's responses to Avena exhibit a political
anomaly. Anti-death penalty advocates find themselves supporting the
unprecedented authority of the Presidential Memorandum. 280 Death penalty
penalty stance dates back to the President's administration of the death penalty during his
service as the Governor of Texas.
275. This Note's discussion of the presidential authority to unilaterally withdraw from
treaties provides a handy example of this phenomenon.
276. See HENK N, supra note 2, at 84 ("In principle as in fact, recurrent competition for
[foreign affairs] power has punctuated relations between President and Congress....").
277. See supra Part III (discussing the incongruence of the two unilateral executive
actions).
278. See supra Part IV (commenting on factors contributing to incongruence).
279. See supra Part V (arguing that the president's actions may be legal, but nonetheless,
ultimately unconstitutional).
280. See Liptak, supra note 47, at A14 (quoting Medellin's lawyer Sandra Babcock as
stating: "The law is on our side .... The President is on our side. I keep having to slap
myself"). However, Babcock and other human rights activists decry withdrawal from the
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states disagree with the President because future foreign policy objectives
might support unilateral presidential abolition of state death penalty statutes.28" '
The pending ruling of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the inevitable
application for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court may clarify the legality
of the Presidential Memorandum. However, withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol eliminates ICJ review of future state VCCR violations. This Note
supports a cooperative three branch approach to solving the problem of state
VCCR violations. In accordance withpacta sunt servanda, "Americans ought





Optional Protocol as devastating to VCCR enforcement. Id.
281. See supra note 273 (noting arguments against the binding authority of the Presidential
Memorandum). In contrast, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol will free the states from
international review of domestic VCCR violations.
282. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 218 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds., 2000) (quoting Thomas Jefferson's statement that "Americans ought never
to demand privileges from foreign nations in order not to be obliged to accord them
themselves").
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